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DAIMLER AND THE JURISDICTIONAL
TRISKELION
ZOE NIESEL*

Twice in the past three years, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme
Court articulated a new landscape of general personal jurisdiction;
namely, exercises of dispute-blind jurisdiction will be based on a
determination of whether a corporation is "at home" in the
jurisdiction, not on whether the corporation had continuous and
systematic contacts in the forum state. The Court's test was further
explained in terms of three different fora: where the corporation is
incorporated, where it maintains its principalplace of business, and
where there are unique circumstancessuggesting that the corporation
is truly "at home." Unfortunately, the Court failed to articulate an
underlying policy that bound together the three bases of general
jurisdiction, and it refused to clarify what types of unique situations
might give rise to general personal jurisdiction outside the state of
incorporationand principalplace of business. Thus, although a new
test was articulated, its boundaries and theoretical foundations
remain woefully unclear.
This Article seeks to elucidate general jurisdiction's new normal
by exploring the jurisdictionaltriskelion-three interconnected bases
of general jurisdiction united by a core underlying policy. While the
state of incorporationand principalplace of business form the first
two bases, this Article suggests that the third basis, now designated
only as "unique circumstances," should be defined by fora in which
the corporationmaintains (1) a physical office, (2) employees, and (3)
corporate decision makers or executives. These considerations have
long appeared in the Court's jurisprudence on general jurisdiction
and have the added benefit of being easy to ascertain without
significant resource expenditure. Further, defining the third basis in
this way lends clarity to the purpose and policy of general
jurisdiction. While the Court has never addressed what policy
supports the exercise of generaljurisdiction, the Daimler Court noted
that principles of general jurisdiction stem from traditional
conceptions of jurisdictional power. Since pre-International Shoe
personaljurisdiction was rooted in the link between sovereign states
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and their citizens, the three modern bases of general jurisdiction
must now emanate from state citizenship.
This Article suggests that a corporation should be considered a
citizen in fora that help it further its own corporate existence and
overarchingdirectives. The state of incorporation, the principalplace
of business, and fora, where there is an office, employees, and
executives in the state, all illustrate this policy-they all promote the
corporation'sdirection and control of its own existence. Accordingly,
all three bases are paradigmaticof generaljurisdictionand emanate
from a core policy rooted in state sovereignty. Re-conceptualizing
general jurisdiction in this way not only clarifies the "at home"
standardadopted in Daimler, but clearly establishes the situations in
which an exercise of dispute-blindjurisdiction will comport with due
process standards.
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INTRODUCTION

Dispute-blind, or general, jurisdiction has long been a hallmark
of American jurisdictional power.1 Pre-dating modern notions of a

1. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
614 (1988) (noting that prior to the twentieth century, jurisdiction was predicated on
the relationship between the sovereign state and the defendant, and not the
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contacts-based jurisdictional inquiry, 2 general jurisdiction has
existed to ensure jurisdiction over a defendant in a particular forum
despite the cause of action having arisen elsewhere.3 While the
theoretical undertones of general jurisdiction have oscillated from
notions of territorial power to considerations of fundamental
fairness,4 the doctrine has always operated to ensure jurisdictional
access to defendants who have some heightened relationship in a
particular forum.
The Supreme Court has only addressed general jurisdiction a few
times, and never in a manner that clarified the doctrine's touchstone
factors or fundamental basis. In the absence of guidance, the lower

character or facts of the underlying dispute).
2. Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 807, 812-13 (2004) (noting that a contacts-based analysis arose from the
Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe, which articulated specific and
general jurisdiction as separate bases for in personam jurisdiction).
3. General jurisdiction is also known as dispute-blind jurisdiction, meaning
that the jurisdictional power of the court is literally "blind" to the facts of the
dispute. Twitchell, supra note 1, at 613. Instead, jurisdiction exists over the
defendant for a dispute that arose anywhere. Id. In contrast, dispute-specific
jurisdiction utilizes the underlying facts of the dispute to create jurisdiction over a
defendant in a forum where the dispute arose. Id.
4. Rhodes, supra note 2, at 902-03 (noting that concerns of sovereignty and
fairness have characterized the search for a theoretical basis for general jurisdiction,
but characterizing the search for a theoretical basis as "quixotic"); compare Ins. Corp.

of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(noting that "[t]he personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."); Sarah R. Cebik, "A
Riddle Wrapped in A Mystery Inside an Enigma": General PersonalJurisdiction and
Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 1, 14 (1998) (stating that fairness
concerns of convenience and predictability seem relatively straightforward in the
context of general jurisdiction); Emily Eng, A New Paradigm: Domicile as the
Exclusive Basis for the Exercise of General Jurisdiction over Individual Defendants,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 845, 871 (2012) (noting that courts have embraced fairness as a
rationale by utilizing reasonableness and fairness factors to assess general
jurisdiction), and B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 1097, 1130 (1990) (noting that the "essence of the issue here, at the
constitutional level, is . . . one of general fairness") (quoting Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952) (quotations omitted)), with Carol
Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
999, 1069 (2012) (discussing the sovereignty rationale for general jurisdiction in the
context of the heightened relationship between the state and its citizen), and Allan
R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758 (1987) (noting that sovereignty considerations
must be at work to ensure that state boundaries do not lose jurisdictional power).
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courts employed a test for general jurisdiction that focused on the
"continuous," "systematic," or "substantial" contacts of a defendant
in the forum.5 While results varied widely, courts universally
recognized that, at some point, a defendant had enough ties to the
forum that the exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction was appropriate.
Since applications here could lead to unpredictable and seemingly
incompatible results, commentators eventually began to propose
curtailing the exercise of general jurisdiction in a number of ways.
The most prominent suggestions included limiting general
jurisdiction to the principal place of business and state of
incorporation, 6 where the corporation had a "branch" facility,7 where
the corporation was acting like the equivalent of a local business,8
where the corporation had a local office, 9 or where the corporation
made corporate policy or conducted core activities.' 0 These proposals

&

5. See, e.g., Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir.
2008) (general jurisdiction "exists when a non-resident defendant's contacts with the
forum state are substantial, continuous, and systematic"); Lakin v. Prudential Sec.,
Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that "substantial, continuous and
systematic contacts [are] required for a finding of general jurisdiction") (quoting
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002)); Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409,
417-18 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A federal court has general jurisdiction when the defendant's
contacts with the forum state are 'substantial' and 'continuous and systematic,' so
that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the
action does not relate to the defendant's contacts with the state."); Bancroft
Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A defendant
whose contacts with a state are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic' can be
haled into court in that state in any action, even if the action is unrelated to those
contacts."); Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[A] defendant whose contacts with a forum are 'continuous and
systematic' may be subject to jurisdiction even when the cause of action has no
relation to those contacts.").
6. See Twitchell, supra note 1, at 676 (arguing that general jurisdiction is
appropriately limited to state of incorporation and principal place of business).
7. Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 137 (2001) (arguing that having a branch in the forum is more
tangible than advertisements or customers, but recognizing that the definition of a
"branch" is not self-evident).
8. Rhodes, supra note 2, at 811 (proposing a "commercial domiciliary" test that
assesses whether "the nonresident defendant is engaging in continuous activities in
the forum similar in nature and volume to the in-state activities of an enterprise
domiciled or based in the forum").
9. George, supra note 4, at 1129 (utilizing an office within the state as a
benchmark for corporate jurisdiction because it signifies a commitment to the
forum).
10. Cebik, supra note 4, at 36-40 (arguing that general jurisdiction is
appropriate where the corporation is incorporated, conducts core activities, or makes
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were aimed at what commentators agreed were exorbitant exercises
of general jurisdiction in the lower courts based on scant or
underdeveloped contacts. Indeed, every federal circuit had at some
point upheld general jurisdiction based on "continuous and
systematic" contacts even in the absence of a corporate
headquarters, branch office, or place of incorporation in the forum.
But that all changed. Twice in the past five years, the Supreme
Court chose to clarify and narrow the boundaries of general
jurisdiction. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown'"
and Daimler AG v. Bauman,12 the Court introduced a new test for
general jurisdiction that assessed whether contacts in the state were
such that they rendered the corporation "essentially at home."' 3 In
doing so, the Court structured general jurisdiction by reference to
three separate, but interrelated, bases. This "jurisdictional
triskelion" embraces three locations: (1) state of incorporation, (2)
principal place of business, and (3) unique situations in which
contacts are such that the corporation is essentially at home.14 The
Court failed, however, to elaborate on the third basis and did not
address what factors, if any, could be used to determine its standard.
Further, the Court did not identify what, if any, underlying policy
bound the three different bases of general jurisdiction together.
This Article explores general jurisdiction's new normal and the
remaining ambiguities that plague recent attempts at clarification.
Central to this purpose is to identify what factors should be used to
articulate the third basis of jurisdiction and what policy can be used
to illuminate a fundamental theoretical structure. Part I traces the
development of modern general jurisdiction from the era of
territorial power to a contacts-based inquiry. Especially noteworthy
here is the mixed-use language employed by the Supreme Court to
conflate principles of specific jurisdiction with general jurisdiction.
An analysis of cases reveals that the continuous and systematic
language that would come to dominate lower court jurisprudence

"top-level" corporate policy).
11. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
12. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
13. Id. at 749 (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851
("A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign ...
corporations to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous
and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.") (emphasis
added). Goodyear represented the first use of the "at home" standard by the Supreme
Court. Such a standard had never previously been cited as the test for general
jurisdiction. Richard D. Freer, Four Specific Problems with the New General
Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L. J. (forthcoming 2015).
14. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62.
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was appropriated from notions of specific jurisdiction and referenced
in a way that confused the two jurisdictional doctrines.' 5 Part II
explores those consequences by examining the lower courts' use of
the continuous and systematic language to create different
touchstone factors for general jurisdiction. A factors-based analysis
proved to be somewhat confusing, as the weight given to different
factors varied by court and situation. Further, a lack of clarity
regarding the underlying policy of general jurisdiction meant that
the factors were assessed in isolation from an overarching
theoretical purpose. Part III then examines the development of the
"at home" standard in Goodyear and Daimler, while Part IV
proposes conceptualizing the current model of general jurisdiction as
three different bases emanating from a core policy. In conducting
such an analysis, it becomes clear that the third basis for general
jurisdiction, defined as "unique situations," has yet to be explored by
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, this Article proposes defining such
unique circumstances by the presence of a corporate office,
employees, and corporate decision makers in the forum state.
The point of the proposed test is not merely to suggest a practical
way to think about the third basis of general jurisdiction, although
that is indeed one of the goals. Instead, the proposed test seeks
ultimately to answer a more difficult question: what theoretical
foundation creates the bases for general jurisdiction? Or, put
another way, what makes state of incorporation and principal place
of business archetypes of general jurisdiction, and how does that
underlying policy help us formulate the third basis for general
jurisdiction? In Part VI this Article answers those questions by
looking primarily to state sovereignty. If it is appropriate for a
defendant to submit to general jurisdiction based on its heightened
relationship with the forum, the relationship must be one between a
sovereign and its citizen-the state may extract its jurisdictional
pound of flesh in the form of dispute-blind jurisdiction when a
corporation has acted in ways that can be said to mimic the
equivalent of citizenship. This Article suggests that a corporation
should be considered a citizen in fora that help it further its own
corporate existence and overarching directives. The state of
incorporation, the principal place of business, and fora where there

15.

Specifically, the Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington used

"continuous and systematic" to describe situations in which specific jurisdiction
existed over the defendant. 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). However, the Court later
appropriated this language to describe two factual situations relating to the
applicability of general jurisdiction. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
Unsurprisingly, the lower courts thought it appropriate to use this language as a
yardstick for general jurisdiction.
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is an office and managers in the state all illustrate this policy-they
are all paradigmatic of general jurisdiction because these fora
further the corporate existence. It is this underlying, cohesive policy
that makes the proposed test theoretically sound in addition to being
practically useful.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
American courts have always recognized some theory of general
jurisdiction. Prior to the twentieth century, courts based their
exercise of jurisdictional power entirely on the relationship between
the forum and the defendant, and never on the circumstances of the
dispute.1 6 As such, all exercises of jurisdiction by the court were
dispute-blind in that the underlying facts played no role in
determining the ability of the court to exercise power over the
defendant.' 7 But courts rarely went so far as to assert power over
individuals or entities located outside the boundaries of the forum
state, simply because defendants at this time were almost always
located in the forum regardless.' 8 Further, the focus on territory as
the root of the court's power meant that courts were divested of
jurisdiction when the underlying dispute occurred in the forum
state, but the defendant was no longer physically present within the
state's territory. As such, Professor Juenger accurately describes
jurisdiction during this time both as "too broad" and "too narrow"-a
court had the power to exercise jurisdiction over defendants present
within the forum's borders when the cause of action arose elsewhere,
but it could not force a defendant to return to the forum if he left
after the cause of action arose.19
The focus on territorial power guided the Supreme Court's first
attempt to establish the parameters of modern personal jurisdiction
in Pennoyer v. Neff.20 Basing its decision on considerations of state
sovereignty, the Court used notions of territoriality, sovereignty,

16. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The
"Power"Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Philip B. Kurland,
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla- A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 569-74
(1958); Twitchell, supra note 1, at 614.
17. Twitchell, supra note 1, at 614.
18. Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law: A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 907, 908 (1981); Joseph J.
Kalo, Jurisdictionas an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi In Rem and
In PersonamPrinciples, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1157 (1978).
19. Juenger, supra note 18, at 908.

20. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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presence, and consent to establish three approaches to jurisdiction. 21
Specifically, jurisdiction could be exercised (1) when service of
process was made in the state, thus establishing the defendant's
physical presence in the territory; (2) where an individual was
domiciled in the state; or (3) where the defendant consented to the
exercise of jurisdiction. 2 2
Central to the Court's approach in Pennoyer was that the
presence of the defendant within the territorial bounds of a state at
the time of service would be considered sufficient for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction; as such, it did not matter if the defendant was
just passing through at the time of service. 23 However, the archetype
of this territorial power theory-an individual who is served with
process while physically present in the state--could not help courts
determine when an intangible entity like a corporation would be
subject to personal jurisdiction. This became particularly
problematic during the late nineteenth century as the private
corporate form rose in popularity, resulting in modern corporations
that conducted business in multiple states. Such entities, which
were incorporated in one state but might be operating in several,
challenged the centrality of physical presence in the doctrine of
personal jurisdiction. As such, to assess the presence or absence of
personal jurisdiction over these entities, courts utilized two
mechanisms--consent and presence based on "doing business." 24
The consent-based theory of corporate jurisdiction operated on
the notion that states could require an out-of-state or foreign
corporation's consent to personal jurisdiction in exchange for
allowing the corporation to do business within the state. 25 To this
end, states enacted statutes that mandated a corporation's consent
to jurisdiction in exchange for the corporation's ability to do business
within the state's boundaries. This approach was based in part on
courts' attempts to appropriate the personal service requirement for

21. Id. at 722.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally William F. Cahill, Jurisdictionover Foreign Corporationsand
Individuals Who Carryon Business Within the Territory, 30 HARV. L. REV. 676 (1917)
(noting that a court may obtain jurisdiction over a corporation by its consent or its
presence, and presence can be based on the corporation engaged in and "doing
business" in the state); Kurland, supra note 16, at 577-78 (noting that two different
theories developed as principles of personal jurisdiction: consent- and presence-based
jurisdiction, both of which were evaluated based on the entities "doing business" in
the state).
25. Kurland, supra note 16, at 578.
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individuals in the context of corporate jurisdiction. 26 As such, forcedconsent statutes 27 usually required that foreign corporations
designate an agent within the state for service of process and file a
written consent to jurisdiction. 28 But forcing corporations to consent
to jurisdiction ultimately raised constitutional concerns. In
International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 29 the Supreme Court struck a
forced consent statute because it unduly burdened interstate
commerce. 30 Specifically, the Court noted that the statute required a
corporation to file a written statement consenting to jurisdiction
when entering the forum, which ultimately functioned as an illegal
condition precedent to doing business that was borne only by out-ofstate or foreign corporations. 31 The Court also questioned the power
of the state to actually deny a business the right to operate in the
state if consent to jurisdiction was not given. 32 In Flexner v.
Farson,33 the Court rejected consent as a basis for jurisdiction over a
partnership, noting that there was no basis by which the state court
could actually exclude the partnership from operating within the
state. 34 These issues suggested that forced-consent statutes such as

26. ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 636 (1965).

& DONALD THEODORE

TRAUTMAN, THE LAw

27. The most common statute expressly forbid a corporation from doing
business in the state before filing a written consent to jurisdiction and designating
an agent for service of process. See, e.g., JAMES C. CAHILL & BASIL JONES,
CALLAGHAN'S ILLINOIS STATUTES ANNOTATED 1917-1920 1 2446(87) (1920).

28. See Simon v. S. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 130 (1915) (citing an example of such
an act in Louisiana: "Whenever any such corporation shall do any business of any
nature whatever in this State without having complied with the requirements of Sec.
1 of this act, it may be sued for any legal cause of action in any Parish of the State
where it may do business, and such service of process in such suit may be made upon
the Secretary of State the same and with the same validity as if such corporation had
been personally served."). "Doing business" as a basis for corporate jurisdiction was
far from a clear concept, but, as Justice Learned Hand wrote, "at least it puts the
real question, and that is something." Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d
139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). See also St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 359 (1882) (requiring
for the exercise of jurisdiction "that the corporation was engaged in business in the
State").
29. 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
30. Id. at 102 (quoting the Kansas statute in question "as a condition precedent
to obtaining authority to transact business in the state, a corporation of another
state was required to file in the office of the secretary of state its written consent,
irrevocable, that process against it might be served upon [the appointed] officer").
31. Id. at 111.
32. Id.
33. 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
34. Id. at 293.
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these could not operate as a basis for achieving jurisdiction over outof-state corporations.
In addition to forced-consent provisions, courts also achieved
by
jurisdiction over foreign or out-of-state corporations
characterizing them as physically present in the state. Specifically,
corporations that were "doing business" in the state could be subject
to jurisdiction, since doing business was the functional equivalent of
an individual's tangible presence within the state's borders. A
number of cases suggested that factors, such as an office, employees,
or transactions, would be used to determine if a corporation was
doing business in the forum. 35 However, it was unclear at what point
activities crossed from mere solicitation in the forum into the
equivalent of physical presence.
Constitutional infirmities, lack of doctrinal clarity, the growth of
national commerce, and the changing nature of modern business
eventually dictated the need for a shift in the jurisdictional narrative
away from Pennoyer.3 6 Accordingly, the Court in International Shoe
v. Washington37 supplemented traditional notions of territorial
power 38 with an analysis concerned with the conduct of the

&

35. See, e.g., People's Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918)
(holding that the corporation was not doing business because its authorized agents
located within the state did not have authority beyond mere solicitation); Phila.
Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268 (1917) (holding that the sale of
railroad tickets on behalf of the corporation by the connecting carried located within
the state did not constitute as doing business); Int'l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Ky., 234
U.S. 579, 586 (1914) (holding that the corporation was doing business in the state of
Kentucky because of the "course of conduct of [its] authorized agents within the
State"); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913) (holding
that the corporation was doing business in the state of New York because it had an
office and agent located within the state); Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry.
Co., 205 U.S. 530, 531 (1907) (holding that the "establishment of a permanent office"
and the "employment of an agent located within the State" indicate that the
corporation is doing business in the state).
36. Kurland, supra note at 16, at 577-86.
37. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
38. Id. at 316. This is not to suggest that InternationalShoe's de-emphasis of
physical presence in the jurisdictional equation removed transient jurisdiction
entirely. Professor Mary Twitchell noted in 1988 that the language of International
Shoe left the door open for transient presence in the forum to remain a valid basis for
jurisdiction. Twitchell, supra note 1, at 624 n.66. Specifically, Professor Twitchell
identified this language from the opinion in InternationalShoe:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,

2015]

DAIMLER

843

defendant. Pursuant to this conduct-oriented test, a defendant
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction where it has sufficient
contacts with the forum state and the exercise of jurisdiction will not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.39 In
establishing this inquiry, the Court drew a distinction between two
different situations: First, where the defendant's contacts with the
state gave rise to the liability in question, and second, where the
defendant had such strong contacts with the state that it would be
appropriate to force the defendant to appear and defend actions
unrelated to its in-state activities."0 The first category established a
mechanism of dispute-specific jurisdiction based on contacts that
were "continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on."41 In contrast, dispute-blind jurisdiction existed where
"continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit . .. on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 42 Although this
language identified dispute-specific and dispute-blind jurisdiction as
two separate bases for jurisdiction, the concepts were often conflated

he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) (emphasis added). Other commentators
agreed that this language revealed that International Shoe's conduct-oriented test
was a supplement to the territorial power theory and that transient presence in the
forum could still confer jurisdiction. See, e.g., Robert Haskell Abrams, Power,
Convenience, and the Elimination of PersonalJurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 58
IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1982) (stating that "the relationship between Pennoyer and
InternationalShoe is that they are highly similar tests of the sovereign's authority to
bind a nonconsenting defendant to the judgment of its courts"); Arthur Taylor von
Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction:General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63
B.U.L. REV. 279, 287-90, 300-07 (1983) (stating that "InternationalShoe announced
a new theory of jurisdiction but did not declare the power theory unacceptable").
These predictions have borne out with time. In Burnham v. Superior Court of
California, Cty. of Marin, a divided Court agreed that, for individuals, transient
presence jurisdiction remained a valid basis for personal jurisdiction. 495 U.S. 604,
637 (1990). Of course, transient presence is not a valid basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction over corporations. See James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273
U.S. 119, 122 (1927) (holding that service on an executive officer of a corporation
while he is temporarily present in the forum does not confer jurisdiction over the
corporation); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014)
(service on executive vice president for marketing in California did not confer general
jurisdiction over French corporation).
39. Intl Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
40. Id. at 317.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 318.
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by the lower courts in the wake of InternationalShoe. For example,
in Kendrick v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.,43 a Pennsylvania resident
brought an action in Pennsylvania against Seaboard Air Line
Railroad ("Seaboard") for injuries sustained in South Carolina due to
the defendant's negligence. 44 Seaboard was incorporated in Virginia
and had its main office in Norfolk.4 5 As such, the plaintiffs choice to
sue in Pennsylvania was bold-Seaboard had no contacts with
Pennsylvania other than an office in Philadelphia that was used to
solicit business.46 The court, however, was only concerned with
whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum in
general to make an exercise of personal jurisdiction appropriate.4 7
Assessing the sales office present in Philadelphia, the court found
that
[T]hese activities, which may best be characterized as the
selling of service, evidence sufficient contacts with the State
of Pennsylvania as to render Seaboard amenable to the
process of this court.

. .

. The fact that the lease for the office

was executed at Seaboard's main office, the rent and
expenses therefor, and the pay of the local employees are
paid by checks sent from Norfolk, Virginia, and that the
office supplies and advertisements are sent from the same
place, can have no effect on our conclusion that the defendant
Seaboard is present here. Once the contacts with the state of
the forum have been established, other transactions of a
defendant, by comparison or otherwise, may not wipe out or
outweigh those contacts. 48
The court makes no mention of whether the plaintiff purchased
his ticket through the Pennsylvania office, leaving the defendant's
solicitation of sales in Pennsylvania as the only possible basis for
personal jurisdiction. The court thus reads International Shoe to
establish some sort of jurisdiction when the defendant has sufficient
contacts with the forum, regardless of whether they are continuous
or systematic, and regardless of whether the cause of action arose in
the forum or not. 4 9 Other courts rejected this liberalized standard. In

43.
44.
45.
46.

98 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. at 373.

47.

Id. at 374.

48. Id. at 374-75 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 373. In fact, the court went so far as to say "the disconnection
between the alleged obligation or liability with a defendant's local activities . . . no
longer [has] any bearing on the question of jurisdiction." Id.
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Murray v. Great Northern Railway,50 a federal district court in
Pennsylvania declined to find jurisdiction in a cause of action
against a Minnesota corporation arising entirely out of its business
in Minnesota. 5 ' In a decision that seemingly contradicts the
reasoning in Kendrick, the court noted that the defendant's
corporate activities in Pennsylvania consisted only of a solicitation
office, which could not justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction for
a cause of action unrelated to activities in the forum. 52
To address post-International Shoe confusion, the Supreme
Court took steps to clarify the bifurcation of dispute-specific and
dispute-blind jurisdiction. The first of two corporate jurisdiction
cases, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 53 dealt with the
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction in the context of
a foreign corporation. In Perkins, a Filipino mining corporation
ceased operations in the Philippines during the hostilities of World
War II, and the president, also the principal stockholder, returned to
his residence in Ohio. 54 While in Ohio, the president opened an office
for the mining company, which was staffed by himself and two
secretaries.5 5 Activities that were carried out from the office included
opening two bank accounts for the company, paying salaries and
other expenses, holding directors' meetings, and supervising
rehabilitation of corporate properties in the Philippines.56
While the mining company was operating in Ohio, the plaintiff, a
nonresident of Ohio, filed suit in an Ohio state court against the
company for dividends allegedly due to her as a stockholder and
damages for the company's failure to issue her certificates for shares
of its stock she allegedly owned.57 The Ohio Supreme Court
determined that Ohio did not have personal jurisdiction over the
company as it was a foreign corporation, and the activities
underlying the suit did not relate to any actions taken by the
company in Ohio.58 Such reasoning was entirely consistent with the

50. 67 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
51. Id. at 944.
52. Id. Further illustrating confusion regarding International Shoe, the court
attempted to distinguish InternationalShoe on its facts. Id. It also noted that, unlike
in Murray, International Shoe "dealt with the power of a state to regulate the
activities of a foreign corporation within its borders and its power to enforce such
regulation through its courts." Id.
53. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
54. Id. at 447.
55. Id. at 447-48.
56. Id. at 448.
57. Id. at 438-39.
58. Id. at 439, 441.
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approach to dispute-specific jurisdiction announced in International
Shoe.5 9
The Supreme Court reversed.60 It determined that Ohio could
"enforce a cause of action not arising out of the [defendant's]
activities in the state of the forum" 6 1 because of the president's
"continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited
wartime activities of the company." 62 The crux of the court's
reasoning was that principles of general fairness dictated allowing
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction when a corporation engages
in continuous activities in a forum state such that it would not be
unfair to subject it to suit on unrelated causes of action.63 Pursuant
to the factual situation, the Court found general jurisdiction to be
appropriate since the president of the company was carrying on in
Ohio "a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily
limited wartime activities of the company." 64 The use of the
"continuous and systematic" language here is particularly
noteworthy, as this was the language used in International Shoe to
describe the doctrine of specific, not general, jurisdiction. 65
Use of the "continuous and systematic" language in the context
of general jurisdiction was also seen in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,6 6 a personal jurisdiction case involving
another foreign corporation. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia
("Helicol") was incorporated in Colombia and provided helicopter
transportation for oil and construction companies operating in South
America.67 After a Helicol helicopter crashed in Peru, the
representatives and survivors of four American citizens killed in the
crash attempted to sue Helicol in Texas state court. 68 The plaintiffs'
claims had no relationship to any activities carried on by Helicol in
Texas, and the Court turned its attention to the doctrine of general
jurisdiction.6 9 The plaintiffs pointed to Helicol's continuous contacts
in the forum: Helicol had purchased a majority of its helicopters in
Texas from Bell Helicopter Company; it had trained its pilots,
management personnel, and maintenance employees in Texas; it had

59.

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945).

60.

Perkins, 342 U.S. at 449.

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 446.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 445.

64.

Id. at 448 (emphasis added).

65.
66.
67.

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
Id. at 409.

68.

Id. at 410, 412.

69.

Id. at 415-16.

2015]

DAIMLER

847

conducted negotiations in Texas that led to the service agreement to
transport employees of American companies in Peru; and it had
received over $5 million in payments drawn on a Texas bank. 70 But
the Court was not impressed, finding that such contacts were not
akin to "the kind of continuous and systematic general business
contacts" that had been found in Perkins.7 1 The Court went on to
note that in the absence of such contacts, general jurisdiction would
be inappropriate. 7 2
Through Perkins and Helicopteros, the Court fixed two factual
endpoints for general jurisdiction. On one end was the exemplar of a
corporation subject to general jurisdiction in the forum-a
corporation that was conducting all operations in the forum, the
president and majority shareholder of which were present in the
forum, and which maintained a corporate office, bank accounts, and
employees in the forum. 73 On the other end was the exemplar of a
corporation not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum-a
corporation that was entering into transactions and negotiations in
the forum but did not have any permanent physical presence in the
forum state. 74 But the standard that should be applied to chart the
middle ground was unclear. In both cases the Court had made
reference to "continuous and systematic" activities, or the lack
thereof, in the applicable fora. 75 But the use of this language
conflated ideas about specific jurisdiction with general jurisdiction.
International Shoe had suggested that general jurisdiction was
appropriate where there were "continuous" contacts that were "so
substantial and of such a nature" that suits based on activities
unrelated to the forum would be considered just and fair.76 Professor
Twitchell suggests that this was indeed the standard applied in both
Perkins and Helicopteros, despite the lip service paid to "continuous
and systematic" contacts.77 Specifically, she argues that the contacts

70. Id. at 410-11.
71. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 421-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The court's use of the terminology,
"general jurisdiction," was a result of the popularization of the distinction first made
by Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). Thus, Helicopteros
represented the first time the Supreme Court utilized "general" and "specific" to
define the dual bases of contacts-based jurisdiction. Id.
73. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
74. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410-11.
75. See id. at 415-16; Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 445, 448.
76. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
77. Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business
Jurisdiction,2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 184 (2001).

848

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:833

at issue in Helicopteros were arguably both continuous and
systematic, and yet the Court denied general jurisdiction based on
the nature of those contacts.78 Ultimately, however, it was up to the
lower courts to parse the language of these opinions and determine
the factors at issue.
II. THE FACTORS-BASED ANALYSIS OF "CONTINUOUS AND
SYSTEMATIC" CONTACTS

When assessing jurisdiction

over foreign corporations,

the

approach taken by the lower courts was primarily to reason by
analogy7 9 and compare cases to the facts of Perkins and
Helicopteros.80 However, the standard cited during this time was
whether "continuous and systematic" contacts existed in the forum
state.8 1

.

78. Id. at 185.
79. That is not to say that all courts took that approach-others took a more
categorical approach to the problem. For example, in Follette v. Clairol, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's refusal to exercise general jurisdiction over a
corporation with what appeared to be systematic and continuous contacts with the
forum. 829 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. La. 1993), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993). The
district court instead chose to limit the exercise of general jurisdiction over a
corporation to the place of incorporation and principal place of business "under the
circumstances presented in this case." Id. at 846 (emphasis omitted). The district
court had noted the argument that general jurisdiction should always be confined to
principal place of business and state of incorporation. Id. A petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court was denied. Follette, 829 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. La. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1163 (1994). Commentators also argued for taking a categorical
approach. See Twitchell, supra note 1, at 669-70 (arguing that general jurisdiction
should always be limited to the state of incorporation and the principal place of
business).
80. See, e.g., Johnston v. Foster-Wheeler Constructors, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 496,
501-03 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (finding that defendant corporation with sufficient contacts
to Alabama was subject to personal jurisdiction); Bechard v. Constanzo, 810 F. Supp.
579, 584-85 (D. Vt. 1992) (finding that a physician from New York was not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Vermont when providing unsolicited treatment on Vermont
resident in New York); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elec. (U.S.A.), Inc.,
671 F. Supp. 1525, 1533 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that defendant Japanese
corporation had sufficient contacts with and was subject to personal jurisdiction in
California); Colon v. Gulf Trading Co., 609 F. Supp. 1469, 1479-80 (D.P.R. 1985)
(finding that defendant sea vessel owner was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Puerto Rico when plaintiff seaman developed symptoms in Puerto Rico from asbestos
condition following his exposure to asbestos while working aboard defendant's vessel
at sea).
81. See, e.g., Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (stating the standard as "general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is . .
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Further, although Perkins and Helicopteros provided useful
bookends, they did not affirmatively identify factors that should be
used in assessing the presence or absence of general jurisdiction. As
such, it was necessary to determine the type, number, and strength
of contacts that would support the existence of dispute-blind
jurisdiction. Lower courts explored this territory by balancing
several factual considerations, including a company's physical
presence in the forum, the revenue produced in the forum, or
whether the company entered into deals in or visited the forum.
Additionally, principles of reasonableness and substantial justice
served to limit the exercise of general jurisdiction even when
continuous and systematic contacts were located in the forum state.
A. Contacts Based on Physicaland QuantitativeFactors
Perhaps the main consideration utilized by courts to determine
whether continuous and systematic contacts existed is the presence
of physical assets in a forum, such as employees or facilities. Courts
have long been persuaded that a physical office in the forum is a
good indicator of general jurisdiction. 82 In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 83 the Second Circuit found that two parent holding

companies, incorporated in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands, were subject to general jurisdiction in New York
because they maintained an investor relations office in New York
City through which they engaged American capital markets. 84 The
activities of the New York office were minimal in comparison to the

permissible if the defendant's business contacts with the forum district are
'continuous and systematic"') (citation omitted); Grand Entm't Grp, Ltd. v. Star
Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 481 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993) ("General jurisdiction exists
where the defendant 'has maintained continuous and substantial' forum
affiliations.") (citation omitted); Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("An enterprise incorporated and even headquartered elsewhere may operate so
continuously and substantially within a state that it is fair to allow anyone to sue the
enterprise in that state on any claim, without regard to where the claim arose.");
Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("If the defendant's activities in the state are 'substantial' or 'continuous
and systematic,' general jurisdiction may be asserted even if the cause of action is
unrelated to those activities.") (citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1382, 1390 (5th Cir. 1987)
(finding that defendant physician with office in Tennessee was not subject to general
jurisdiction in Mississippi); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 793
(10th Cir. 1979) (finding that defendant corporation was subject to general
jurisdiction in Mississippi where it had a manufacturing plant).
83. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
84. Id. at 92, 97-98.
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companies' world-wide operations, but the court was impressed with
the activities carried on by this office, including fielding inquiries
from investors and potential investors and organizing meetings
between defendants' officials and investors or financial analysts.85 In
other cases, courts have found a combination of an office plus
employees to be sufficient contacts to give rise to general
jurisdiction.8 6 For example, in Hein v. Taco Bell, Inc., the court
sustained a finding of jurisdiction based on the presence of sixteen
Taco Bell locations within the state of Washington.8 7 The court noted
specifically that the presence of these locations meant that Taco Bell
was employing hundreds of people within the state, which supported
the existence of general jurisdiction. 88
The weight given to the presence of a physical office during the
era of continuous and systematic contacts is likely an outgrowth of
InternationalShoe. There, the Court cited Missouri, Kansas & Texas
Railway Co. v. Reynolds,89 and Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.9 0 to
support the notion that courts could exercise jurisdiction in
situations where the underlying events occurred outside the forum. 91
In both Reynolds and Tauza, the presence of an office or employees
was an important component of determining that dispute-blind
jurisdiction was appropriate. 92 Specifically, Reynolds upheld the
exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation
that maintained an office and an agent in the forum for the purpose
of soliciting and taking reservations. 93 Similarly, in Tauza, the court
upheld the exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction over an out-of-state
corporation that was operating a branch in the forum that employed
nine employees. 94 Although these cases were decided under the preInternational Shoe "doing business" standard, they suggested that

85. Id. at 97.
86. See, e.g., Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d
1039, 1042-43 (2d Cir.1990) (finding that defendant corporation had no office in New
York and, therefore, was not subject to personal jurisdiction); Lane v. Vacation
Charters, Ltd., 750 F. Supp. 120, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that defendant
corporation had no office in New Vork, and employees' attendance of two trade shows
in New York was not enough to subject corporation to general jurisdiction); Bryant v.
Finnish Nat'1 Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1965) (finding that defendant corporation
had no office in New York and, therefore, was not subject to personal jurisdiction).
87. 803 P.2d 329, 332-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
88. Id. at 332.
89. 255 U.S. 565 (1921).
90. 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917).
91. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
92. See Reynolds, 255 U.S. at 565; Tauza, 115 N.E. at 916, 918.
93. Reynolds, 255 U.S. at 565, aff'g 117 N.E. 913 (1917).
94. Tauza, 115 N.E. at 916, 918.
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an office and employees were highly relevant in the context of
dispute-blind jurisdiction. 95
It is also worth noting that an office, facilities, or employees in
the forum state are not always dispositive of continuous and
systematic contacts. For example, in Maclnnes v. Fontainebleau
Hotel Corp., the Second Circuit determined that a corporation was
not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum based merely on the
presence of a sales office in the state because the office was not
related to the core business of the defendant.9 6 But even if the
presence of an office did not guarantee general jurisdiction, the lack
of an office was a frequently cited reason for refusing to exercise
dispute-blind jurisdiction.9 7
Another touchstone of continuous and systematic contacts was
the quantity of revenue generated or sales made in the jurisdiction.
Few courts have found the presence of general jurisdiction based
only on a large number of sales in the forum. Instead, most courts
have embraced the notion that large dollar value sales, especially
when they represent only a small percentage of a company's overall
sales, are insufficient to create general jurisdiction without other
contacts.9 8 For example, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 99 the Second Circuit determined that an outof-state corporation could not be subject to general jurisdiction in
Vermont based solely on the fact that it had made $4 million in sales
in the jurisdiction over a five-year period. 100 The court went on to

95. Despite the citation in Perkins, the Court later distanced itself from Tauza
and Barrows in DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Specifically, the Court
noted that those cases were the products of Pennoyer's rigid focus on territoriality
and lacked relevance in the modern era. Id. at 761 n.18. Prior to Daimler, however,
the relevance of these cases was never questioned.

96.
97.

257 F.2d 832, 833-35 (2d Cir. 1958).
See, e.g., Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1993)

(pointing out that defendant corporation never maintained an office in Maryland);
Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 214-15, 217 (1st Cir. 1984) (pointing out that
defendant corporation never maintained an office in New Hampshire).

98.

See Injen Tech. Co. v. Advanced Engine Mgmt., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1189,

1194 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that 2% of sales in the forum insufficient contact for

general jurisdiction); Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 85758 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that limited sales numbers in the forum did not generate
general jurisdiction); Stairmaster Sports/Med. Prods., Inc. v. Pac. Fitness Corp., 916

F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 78 F.3d 602 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (3% of
sales not enough); see also Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 373-77 (5th
Cir. 1987) (finding contracts exceeding $72 million and purchases exceeding $195
million in the forum not sufficient to create general jurisdiction).

99.
100.

84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 573.
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find, however, that the company's relationships with independent
dealers, visits by company personnel to those dealers, and
advertising and support lines available to Vermont residents
suggested that the defendant had sufficient contacts in toto to create
general jurisdiction.1 0 ' A similar analysis was employed by the
Eighth Circuit in Lakin v. PrudentialSecurities, Inc.102 In that case,
the court determined that, although a high volume of sales does not
automatically create dispute-blind jurisdiction, Prudential Securities
was subject to general jurisdiction in Missouri based on its $10
million loan portfolio in that state. 0 3 The court reasoned that
advertising in the forum and the nature of the loans established that
the company had entered into ongoing lending relationships with
thousands of Missouri residents in a manner suggesting continuous
and systematic contacts.10 4
The approach of courts in considering revenue or sales as only a
factor supporting jurisdiction seems appropriately measured in light
of Supreme Court guidance suggesting that the number of sales
alone should not determine general jurisdiction. In Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, 0 5 the Court determined whether Hustler Magazine would
be subject to specific jurisdiction in New Hampshire for purported
libel of a public figure. The court noted that the magazine sold ten to
fifteen thousand copies in New Hampshire each month, putting
yearly numbers at somewhere between 120,000 and 180,000.106
Although it did not elaborate on the question of general jurisdiction,
the Court noted that that the number of subscriptions alone "may
not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a cause of action
unrelated to those activities." 0 7 The First and Fifth Circuits
subsequently cited Keeton in connection with the proposition that a
large number of sales was insufficient in isolation for purposes of
08
general jurisdiction.

&

101. Id. at 576.
102. 348 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003).
103. Id. at 709.
104. Id. at 710.
105. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
106. Id. at 772.
107. Id. at 779.
108. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 650 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The Supreme Court
reasoned that if . . . sales were unrelated to the cause of action, they would be
insufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction."); Glater v. Eli Lilly
in New Hampshire [are
Co., 744 F.2d 213, 216-17 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Lilly's sales ...
not] related to [plaintiffs] injury in the sense that the circulation of magazines in
New Hampshire was related to the injury in Keeton.").
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But despite cutting the potency of a quantitative analysis with
other qualitative factors, the lower courts still achieved inconsistent
results when assessing general jurisdiction. Volume of sales or
revenue cited as supporting general jurisdiction (when combined
with other factors) ranged from hundreds of millions of dollars to
just a few hundred thousand dollars, with the types of supporting
factors varying widely. The Ninth Circuit found general jurisdiction
where a company generated hundreds of millions of dollars in the
forum, was licensed to do business in the forum, and had engaged in
political activity in the forum to protect its market and products.' 09
The Federal Circuit supported a finding of general jurisdiction where
a company generated millions of dollars of sales in the forum and
employed independent distributors.11 0 Finally, the Sixth Circuit
found general jurisdiction on a company with one sales solicitor in
the state and sales in the amount $279,557 in one year."' With such
disparate results, it is not surprising that commentators criticized
the use of quantitative factors in the jurisdictional inquiry as leading
to uncertainty for businesses and confusion for courts.112
Lower courts also assessed where negotiations, meetings, or
visits took place, or where contracts were executed, to determine if
general jurisdiction was appropriate. For example, in Bearry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.,113 the out-of-state defendant was not subject to
general jurisdiction in the forum despite millions of dollars of sales
in the state because the sales contracts had been carefully
negotiated and executed outside of the forum.1 14 This suggests that
companies had the option of structuring transactions to insulate
themselves from jurisdiction in the forum state. Additionally, such
reasoning dictates that payment tendered in the forum state for
services performed elsewhere would not provide general jurisdiction.
The Third Circuit explored this conclusion in Gehling v. St. George's
School of Medicine."15 In that case, the court determined that a

109. Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1173-74 (9th Cir.
2006).
110. LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
ill. Mich. Natl Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 463, 467 (6th Cir.
1989).
112. See, e.g., Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the DueProcess Contours of General Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT'L BUS.
& L. 49, 61 (2012) ("The inconsistent results quantitative analyses produce stymie
the very protections the Due Process Clause was intended to protect.").

113.
114.
115.

818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 375-76.
773 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1985).
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foreign medical school was not subject to general jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania because the income derived from Pennsylvania
residents who attended the school was not related to in-state
activities, but instead was related to services performed in
Grenada.1 16 Other cases have similarly allowed defendants to shield
themselves from the exercise of general jurisdiction when contracts
were either negotiated or performed outside of the forum.1 17
Lower courts have also considered the presence of agents of the
defendant in the forum state.118 Frequent visits to the forum state by
officers or agents of a defendant were often held to subject a
defendant to general jurisdiction in the forum if other factors were
present.11 9 But much like the quantitative analysis described above,
this added an element of uncertainty to the analysis. Helicopteros
suggested that a few visits by employees to engage in training or
enter into transactions would not be enough to subject the defendant
to jurisdiction in the absence of other factors. 120 Thus, the lower
courts tended to deny jurisdiction when there were only sporadic
visits to the state,121 and would uphold jurisdiction only if visits
suggested a continued presence in the forum.1 22

116. Id. at 542.43.
117. See J & J Marine, Inc. v. Le, 982 S.W.2d 918, 926-27 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that defendant corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas
when negotiations, payment, and performance of contract took place in Alabama);
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Babcock Mex., S.A. de C.V., 597 So. 2d 110, 112-13 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that defendant corporation was not subject to general
jurisdiction in Louisiana when all sales and deliveries took place in Mexico).
118. Pathman v. Grey Flannel Auctions, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (defendant's "two to three" business trips to Florida every year were
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction); Bluewater Trading, LLC v. Fountaine
Pajot, S.A., No. 07-61284-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D. Fla. July 9,
2008) (defendant's annual attendance at the Miami International Boat Show did not
support general jurisdiction).
119. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 570, 572-73 (2d
Cir. 1996) (over 150 visits in six years considered; general jurisdiction sustained
based on visits, relationships with dealers, and millions of dollars in sales in the
forum); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 112, 118, 122 (D.
Mass. 2007) (visits every week to the forum supported general jurisdiction); 3M
Innovative Props. Co. v. InFocus Corp., No. CIV.04-0009 (JNE/JGL), slip op. at 4 (D.
Minn. Feb.- 9, 2005) (finding that visits every other week to the forum supported a
finding of general jurisdiction when combined with millions in sales in the forum).
120. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-18
(1984).
121. Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2010)
("isolated visits to a forum" are not enough); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 701
(7th Cir. 2010) (two visits to the state in ten years not enough); Fisher v. Teva PFC
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B. Reasonableness Factors
While the courts have utilized the above factors in assessing
contacts for the purposes of general jurisdiction, contacts alone have
not ended the inquiry. The lower courts have consistently utilized
"reasonableness factors" to determine whether an exercise of general
jurisdiction would comport with Due Process notions of fair play and
substantial justice. These factors were announced in Asahi Metal
Industry Co.,123 which involved the application of the specific
jurisdiction doctrine to an indemnity action between two foreign
corporations. The Asahi Court determined that, regardless of
contacts, an exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would be
inappropriate in light of five reasonableness factors: the burden on
the defendant, the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiffs interest in a convenient forum, the judicial system's
interest in efficiency, and the shared interests of the several states
in furthering substantive social policies.

12 4

The Court did not

specifically state whether this reasonableness analysis was limited
to specific jurisdiction or if it also applied in cases of general
jurisdiction.
Despite this ambiguity, the lower courts seemed willing to
embrace a reasonableness inquiry in both dispute-blind and specific
jurisdiction. For example, in de Reyes v. Marine Management and
Consulting, Ltd.,125 the survivors of a Honduran sailor killed in
international waters off the coast of Oregon brought suit against
Wallem Shipmanagement, Ltd. ("Wallem"), a Hong Kong ship
management corporation with its principal place of business in Hong
Kong. 126 Wallem electronically directed performance of its ship
management services from offices in Hong Kong.1 27 However, it also
stationed employees in regional corporate offices around the globe to

SRL, 212 F. App'x 72, 76 (3d Cir. 2006) (visits just a few times a year not persuasive

for finding general jurisdiction); Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d
267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995) (few visits to the state not enough); Gates Learjet Corp. v.
Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1984) (few visits to the state not enough).
122. C.f Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 270 (noting that a "[defendant's] lack of a regular
place of business in [the forum state] is significant, and is not overcome by a few
visits").
123. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
124. Id. at 113-16.
125. 586 So. 2d 103 (La. 1991).
126. Id. at 104.
127. Id.
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engage in on-site inspection, analysis, and transaction negotiation. 128
The plaintiffs initiated suit in Louisiana, the location of one of these
regional offices.1 29 In determining if general jurisdiction existed over
the defendant, the Supreme Court of Louisiana explicitly adopted a
two-part test for general jurisdiction: (1) minimum contacts, and (2)
application of the reasonableness factors.1 30 The court noted that
although the Supreme Court had not adopted the fairness factors in
the context of general jurisdiction, InternationalShoe had eschewed
a "simply mechanical or quantitative" analysis in favor of an
approach that linked minimum contacts with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. 13 ' The approach of the de Reyes
court was not uncommon in the post-Asahi world.1 32 Indeed, several
federal circuits affirmatively declared that general jurisdiction was
subject to a reasonableness inquiry, despite a lack of guidance from
the Supreme Court.133

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 109.
131. Id.
132. See Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (5th Cir. 1990)
(applying a minimum contacts and fairness test); Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell,
Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 393 (11th Cir. 1988) (applying a minimum contacts and fairness
test); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying a
continuous and systematic contacts and fairness test); Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying a continuous and systematic
contacts test); Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479, 1482 (D. Guam 1990)
(applying a three-part test that looks at the contacts with the forum state and
reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction); Kervin v. Red River Ski Area, Inc., 711 F.
Supp. 1383, 1389 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (applying a minimum contacts and fairness test);
Simmons v. SeaTide Int'l, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (E.D. La. 1988) (applying a
two-part minimum contacts and fairness test); Palmer v. Kawaguchi Iron Works,
Ltd., 644 F. Supp. 327, 329-30 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (applying a two-part test that looks at
the fairness of asserting jurisdiction and whether the assertion of jurisdiction has a
basis in the laws of Illinois).
133. See Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1993) ("Asahi's interpretation of International Shoe as entailing separate
contacts and reasonableness inquiries is not limited to the specific jurisdiction
context."); see also Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 464-65 (1st Cir.
1990) (listing the general jurisdiction analysis as (1) minimum contacts and (2) the
five "fair play and substantial justice" factors). But see Behagen v. Amateur
Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731, 733-34 (10th Cir. 1984) (disagreeing that
the reasonableness factors apply).
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III. THE ADOPTION OF THE "AT HOME" STANDARD

A. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown
A factors-based analysis for general jurisdiction ultimately
proved messy-it was difficult for courts to apply and was
consistently criticized by commentators. But it also appeared that
general jurisdiction was not going away any time soon, as courts
consistently used the doctrine as a basis for adjudicative power, even
in the absence of additional Supreme Court guidance. An attempt at
further clarification from the Court finally came in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown.13 4 Coming from a case heard in the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, Goodyear arose out of a wrongful
death action involving two American teenagers who died following a
bus accident in France. 35 After competing in an international soccer
tournament, Julian Brown and Matthew Helms, thirteen-year old
boys from the state of North Carolina, were killed when the bus they
were riding in with their teammates and coaches veered off the road
and overturned near Paris, France.1 36 Both boys sustained serious
injuries that ultimately proved fatal, and it was alleged that failure
of one of the bus's tires was the cause of the accident. 3 7 The tire in
question was manufactured by Goodyear Lastikleri T. A. S.
("Goodyear Turkey"), a wholly owned Turkish subsidiary of its
American parent, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company ("Goodyear
USA").3 8
The parents of the victims, serving as the administrators of the
estates, commenced an action for damages in North Carolina state
court.13 They named Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation, as a
defendant, along with Goodyear Turkey and two other wholly owned
foreign subsidiaries, Goodyear Dunlop Tires France SA ("Goodyear
France") and Goodyear Luxembourg Tires SA ("Goodyear
Luxembourg").1 4 0 Goodyear USA had plants in North Carolina and
did not contest the exercise of the North Carolina court's jurisdiction
over it; however, the foreign subsidiaries claimed that a North
Carolina court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them.141
They initially supported their motions to dismiss with affidavits

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
Id. at 2850.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2850-52.
Id. at 2850.
Id.
Id.
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stating that each company did not maintain offices in North
Carolina and did no business at all in North Carolina.J 42 However,
additional evidence showed that from 2004 to 2007, tires
manufactured by Goodyear USA's foreign subsidiaries had, in fact,
been shipped to North Carolina.1 43 The tires in question had not
been shipped by their original manufacturer-they had reached the
state through the operation of a continuous and "highly-organized
distribution process" carried on by the foreign subsidiaries' parent
company.1 4 4 The foreign subsidiaries did not maintain their own
distribution systems in the United States but would instead rely on
their parent company and its affiliates to distribute the subsidiaries
products.14 5 Indicative of this process was the very tire at issue in
the bus accident-it had been manufactured for sale in the United
States and had instructions written on it in English.1 46
On review, the Supreme Court determined that general
jurisdiction does not flow from a foreign subsidiary participating in
its parent company's distribution scheme in the United States.147
Accordingly, the fact that some tires manufactured by the
defendants did in fact end up in North Carolina was inadequate for a
finding of general jurisdiction.14 8 The Court referred back to Perkins
as a textbook example of the exercise of general jurisdiction and
declined to find that foreign subsidiaries were subject to general
jurisdiction in a forum merely because their products traveled in the
stream of commerce to the forum state. 4 9 Quoting International
Shoe, the court noted that: "A court may assert general jurisdiction
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State
are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at
home in the forum State." 5 0
The prominent addition of the "at home" language in Goodyear
seemed to add something to the jurisdictional equation, but it left
many questions unanswered.15 1 Although on the facts of Goodyear it
was apparent that the foreign subsidiaries were not at home in

142.

Joint

Appendix

at

154-56,

164-66,

183-86,

Goodyear

Dunlop

Tires

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011), (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 4628575.
143. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2852.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2855.
148. Id. at 2857.
149. Id. at 2856.
150. Id. at 2851 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
151. Id. at 2851, 2853-54.

2015]

DAIMLER

859

North Carolina, it was still unclear how this standard would be
applied in the future. 152 For example, would the presence of
employees or offices in the state be enough to render a corporation
"at home"? Under the new standard, would Goodyear USA have been
subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina, a state where it
maintained facilities and employees? Further, by referencing
Perkins, did the Court intend to limit the exercise of general
jurisdiction only to situations where a company's principal place of
business was in the forum state?
The unanswered questions raised by enigmatic Goodyear led to a
reaction that was both swift and severe. The case was criticized for
refusing to accept the changing nature of transnational business
practices and create workable standards for modern realities. 5 3 To
some, Goodyear suggested that subsidiaries would not lose the
benefits of the American market while insulating themselves from
general jurisdiction by having their products distributed through an
American parent company.1 54 It was believed this standard would
encourage shoddy production in wholly owned foreign companies
who would cloak themselves in the protection of the very distribution
scheme sanctioned in Goodyear.S6 In this way, Goodyear could be
read as a blueprint for foreign subsidiaries wishing to ensure that a
U.S. court cannot exercise jurisdiction over them.
Concerns about the implications of Goodyear were also fueled by
the Supreme Court's reference only to the place of incorporation and
the principal place of business of a corporation as the "paradigm"
forums able to exercise general jurisdiction over a corporation. 156
Scholars questioned whether the "at home" language and the
identification of these paradigms limited jurisdiction entirely to
those two places.157 However, if the Court had wished to limit

152. Id. at 2857.
153. See, e.g., Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez!
Oyez! Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdictionin International
ProductsLiability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 143 (2012) (arguing instead
that a stream-of-distribution theory or jurisdiction would be more appropriate with
the changing times).
154. Id. at 131.
155. Stephanie Glynn, Toxic Toys and Dangerous Drywall: Holding Foreign
ManufacturersLiable for Defective Products-The Fund Concept, 26 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 317, 342 (2012) (arguing that the Court has allowed foreign manufacturers to
insulate themselves by targeting U.S. market through distribution chains while
claiming ignorance as to where their products are sold).
156. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.
157. See, e.g., Meir Feder, Goodyear, "Home," and the UncertainFuture of Doing
Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 677 (2012) ("[T]he Goodyear opinion did
include several clues suggesting that the Court may have intended the at home
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general jurisdiction in such a categorical way, it likely would have
adopted a bright line rule enunciating this standard like it did in the
context of corporate citizenship for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.1 58 Thus, the better view would prove to be that the "at
home" language used in Goodyear can also permit general
jurisdiction to be exercised when a company engages in some type of
"continuous and systematic" contacts in a state that met the "at
home" threshold.15 9 What those contacts would be, however, was left
unclear.
In navigating the waters post-Goodyear, a number of lower
courts saw Goodyear for what it was intended to be: a narrowing of
general jurisdiction to reach only situations where the corporation
had substantial contacts and was truly at home in the forum. For
example, in Abelesz v. OTP Bank, the Seventh Circuit found that the
U.S. contacts of two Hungarian banks were insufficient to confer
general jurisdiction over the defendants, even when those contacts
included thousands of accounts in the United States valued at over
$250 million dollars. 6 0 The court reasoned that such contacts did
not mean that the banks were "at home" in the forum as mere
continuous forum contacts were no longer enough to sustain a
Additionally, other courts
finding of general jurisdiction.1 6
recognized that Goodyear limited the scope of general jurisdiction,
especially when applied to large national or international
corporations.1 62 In Chavez v. Dole Food Co., the court found that

standard as a narrow one, perhaps extending no further than a corporation's state of
incorporation and principal place of business.").
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2005) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of [every] State [and foreign state] by which it has been incorporated and of
the State [or foreign state] where it has its principal place of business."); Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192-94 (2010) (favoring simple jurisdictional rules in this
context).
159. Lonny Hoffman, Further Thinking About Vicarious Jurisdiction:Reflecting
on Goodyear v. Brown and Looking Ahead to Daimler AG v. Bauman, 34 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 765, 778 (2013).
160. 692 F.3d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 2012) (identifying the contacts as (1) 4,884
accounts worth over $93 million and 1,500 accounts worth around $147 million, (2)
contracts and negotiations with United States banks, and (3) frequent business trips
by bank personnel to the United States).
161. Id. ("The proper inquiry is not, as plaintiffs suggest, whether a defendant's
contacts 'in the aggregate are extensive.' The issue under the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is whether the contacts are so 'continuous
and systematic' as to render [defendants] essentially at home in the forum.") (quoting
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851).
162. See Bowles v. Ranger Land Sys., Inc., 527 F. App'x 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding that defendant corporation's contacts with forum state were not sufficient to
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although the defendant corporation owned property in Delaware and
sold a large number of products in Delaware, the corporation
operated nationwide, and Delaware was no more a corporate home
than any other state.163 The court noted that the "at home" language
in Goodyear rejected the idea that national or international
corporations were subject to general jurisdiction throughout the
United States, as such entities are presumably doing a good deal of
business in every state. 164
In contrast, other courts did not recognize the significance of the
"at home" language in Goodyear and continued with business as
usual. These courts ignored the substantive contribution of this
language and continued to focus on the presence, or absence, of what
they deemed "continuous and systematic" contacts. For example, in
Ruben v. United States, 165 the court found general jurisdiction over a
foreign architecture firm that had completed several projects in
Pennsylvania, but did not have an office, bank account, or property
in Pennsylvania.1 66 Further, the architecture firm derived only 1% of
its U.S. revenue from Pennsylvania.1 6 7 Applying the "continuous and
systematic" standard, the court reasoned that while the percentage
of revenue the firm earned in Pennsylvania was small, the services
performed for its Pennsylvania clients were central to its core
business and involved high-profile institutions or sites.1 68 Other
courts cited Goodyear's "at home" standard in name, but did nothing
to change their analysis. In U.S. ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co.,169
the District of Columbia Circuit assessed the presence of general
jurisdiction over a company located in Jordan that did business
primarily in the Middle East.1 70 Applying Goodyear's "at home"
standard, the court found that the defendant was subject to general
jurisdiction in Washington, D.C., because it had entered into $159

constitute systematic contacts as required by Goodyear); Sides v. Harley-Davidson,

No. Civ. A. 12-6330, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2013) (hold that placing a
product in the stream of commerce did not constitute continuous and systematic
contacts necessary to subject general jurisdiction over corporation); Lester v. Presto

Lifts, Inc., No. CV 12-398-PHX-PGR, slip op. at 6 (D. Ariz. June 19, 2012) (holding
that defendant was not subject to general jurisdiction because it did not have

continuous and systematic contacts as described in Goodyear).
163. 947 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443 (D. Del. 2013).
164. Id.
165. 918 F. Supp. 2d 358 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
166. Id. at 359-60.
167. Id. at 359.
168. Id. at 360.
169. 952 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2013).
170.

Id. at 115.
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million worth of government subcontracts in the United States,
worked with numerous American companies, and operated an
English-language website.1 71 Such considerations fly in the face of
Goodyear, which suggests that a true corporate home, at the level of
the state of incorporation or the principal place of business, is
necessary for general jurisdiction, and that continuous presence in
the jurisdiction is not enough.1 72 Regardless, many courts did not
recognize the significance of the Court's new approach.1 73
B. Daimler A.G. v. Bauman
In 2014, the Supreme Court added yet another decision to the
mix-Daimler A.G. v. Bauman.174 The facts of Daimler arose from
Argentina's "Dirty War," a period of state-sanctioned terrorism that
involved the use of military and security forces to conduct guerillastyle violence against individuals allegedly associated with
socialism.1 75 The plaintiffs in Daimler were former employees, or
relatives of employees, of Mercedes-Benz Argentina during 1976-

171.

Id. at 116.

172. Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2888 (2014) (stating that Goodyear makes clear that
even a company's substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts in the forum are

now insufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction).
173. See Neeley v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-325 JAR, slip op. at
8-12 (E.D. Mo. July 29, 2013) (finding general jurisdiction based on substantial sales
in the forum); Hess v. Bumbo Int'l Tr., 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 594 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
(finding general jurisdiction based on relationship with distributor in Texas and
large volume of sales); Ashbury Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Cadex Def., Inc., No. 3:11CV00079,
slip op. at 12 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2012) (finding general jurisdiction based on
solicitation of Virginia customers); McFadden v. Fuyao N. Am., Inc., No. 10-CV14457, slip op. at 4-9 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2012) (finding general jurisdiction over
foreign manufacturer in Michigan based on history of contracts with General
Motors).
174. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). The timing of this case speaks to the growing
importance of the issue. Perkins was issued in 1952, Helicopteros was issued in 1984,
Goodyear was issued in 2011, and Daimler was issued in 2014. Daimler, 134 S. Ct.
746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 445 (1952). Thus, there were 32 years between
Helicopteros and Perkins, 27 years between Goodyear and Helicopteros, but only
three years between Goodyear and Daimler.
175. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. See generally LAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE
DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
UNITED NATIONS (2000) (describing the various human rights abuses that occurred

during this time).
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1983.176 These plaintiffs alleged that Mercedes-Benz Argentina
collaborated with Argentina's state police to kidnap, torture, and kill
workers who were targeted by the state. 177 During this period of
time, Mercedes-Benz Argentina was the wholly owned Argentinean
subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft ("Daimler"), a
German public stock company that manufactures Mercedes-Benz
vehicles. 178 In 2004, twenty-two Argentinian residents filed suit
against Daimler's predecessor in interest in the Northern District of
California, alleging claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the
Torture Victim Protection Act, as well as wrongful death and
intentional infliction of emotional distress under the laws of
California and Argentina.179 These plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler
vicariously liable for the actions of Mercedes-Benz Argentina during
the period in question. 8 0
The incidents complained of by plaintiffs centered on MercedesBenz Argentina's plant in Gonzalez Catan, Argentina; thus, no part
of the alleged collaboration with Argentina's state police took place
outside of Argentina.181 As such, Daimler questioned the choice of
the American forum, and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.1 82 The plaintiffs, in turn, maintained that
jurisdiction over Daimler could be founded on the California contacts
of Mercedes-Benz USA, an indirect subsidiary of Daimler that
served as Daimler's exclusive importer and distributor in the United
States.183 Mercedes-Benz USA had multiple contacts with
California-it had a regional office, vehicle preparation center, and
classic car center in the state.1 84 In addition, California was a
significant market for both Mercedes-Benz USA and Daimler. 8 5
Because of the high number of luxury vehicle sales in the state,
Mercedes-Benz USA's California sales accounted for 2.4% of
Daimler's total worldwide sales.1 86

176.

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 748.

177.

Id.

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 752.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. Because Daimler conceded that Mercedes-Benz USA was subject to
general jurisdiction in the forum, the exact nature of the subsidiary's activities in
California was not developed. However, at least this much is known: Daimler's
worldwide sales in 2004 were $192 billion. Id. at 766-67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Based on Mercedes-Benz USA's contacts with California,
plaintiffs alleged that jurisdiction over Daimler was appropriate,
since Mercedes-Benz USA could be considered the "jurisdictional
agent" of Daimler.1 8 7 The Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that agency
was established by considering the importance of the activities
performed by Mercedes-Benz USA to Daimler and that
"reasonableness" did not bar the exercise of jurisdiction.1 8 8
Specifically, considering "the extensive business operations of that
subsidiary, the interest of California in adjudicating important
questions of human rights, [and] our substantial doubt as to the
adequacy of Argentina as an alternative forum," the Ninth Circuit
determined that Daimler had not presented a compelling case
showing that an exercise of jurisdiction, achieved by extending the
contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA to Daimler, would be inappropriate
in light of fair play and substantial justice.1 89

Accordingly, 2.4% of this figure would mean that Mercedes-Benz USA's California
sales would equal approximately $4.6 billion. Id.
187. Id. at 752.
188. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd,
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
189. Id. at 930. The Ninth Circuit's agency test looks to whether the subsidiary
functions as the parent's representative "in that it performs services that are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a
representative to perform them, the corporation's own officials would undertake to
perform substantially similar services." Id. at 920 (quoting Chan v. Soc'y
Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994)). At the time of this decision, six
other circuits had rejected the logic utilized by the Ninth Circuit. Jeffrey A. Van
Detta, Some Legal Considerations for E.U.-Based MNEs Contemplating High-Risk
Foreign Direct Investments in the Energy Sector After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum and Chevron Corporation v. Naranjo, 9 S.C. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 161, 261-62
n.311 (2013) (identifying the 8th Circuit, 5th Circuit, 6th Circuit, 7th Circuit, 4th
Circuit, and 11th Circuit). Unlike the Ninth Circuit, these Circuits use an "alter ego"
test for determining when a subsidiary's contacts should be attributed to the parent.
See, e.g., Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362-63
(6th Cir. 2008) (applying the alter ego theory of personal jurisdiction in a diversity
action); Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corps., 327 F.3d 642, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2003)
(applying an alter ego test for determining when a subsidy's contacts should be
attributed to the parent corporation); Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d
1286, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2000) (examining a corporation's subsidy's contacts to the
forum to determine if corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction); IDS Life Ins.
Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
parent corporation can be liable for a subsidy's torts if there is reason for piercing the
corporate veil and attributing subsidy's acts to the parent); Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 62-63 (4th Cir. 1993) (examining the parent-subsidy
relationship of the defendant and its subsidy corporation for the purposes of
asserting personal jurisdiction); Dalton v. R&W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363
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The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Due
Process Clause precluded the District Court from exercising general
jurisdiction over Daimler in California, "given the absence of any
California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims
9 0 Thus, while Goodyear had
described in the complaint."o
answered
the question of whether "foreign subsidiaries of a United States
parent corporation [could be] amenable to suit in state court on
claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum
State," Daimler addressed when a subsidiary's United States
contacts provide the basis for the exercise of dispute-blind
jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation.1 9
Because jurisdiction in Daimler was predicated on general
jurisdiction, the Court addressed the historical development of the
doctrine since International Shoe.192 Specifically, the Court noted
that the "continuous and systematic" language in InternationalShoe
had been divorced from its original application in the context of
specific jurisdiction-pursuant to International Shoe, exercises of
case-specific jurisdiction would be when "activities of the corporation

(5th Cir. 1990) (applying the alter ego theory of personal jurisdiction). This alter ego
test looks to whether the parent controls the subsidiary to such a degree that the
latter can be considered the mere instrument of the former and if a failure to
disregard their separate entities would result in fraud or injustice. See Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the alter ego exception). It seems
likely that had an alter ego test been employed, Mercedes-Benz USA would not have
been considered the jurisdictional agent for Daimler. See Justin Kesselman,
MultinationalCorporateJurisdiction& The Agency Test: Should the United States be
a Forum for the World's Disputes?, 47 NEw ENG. L. REV. 361, 372-73 (2012) ("In
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., jurisdiction would not have attached under the
alter-ego test.").
190. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. Specifically, the question was as follows:
"whether it violates due process for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an indirect corporate
subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum State." Id. at
760 n.16.
191. Id. at 757 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131
S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011)). Interestingly, the Court had previously decided that
service effected on an American subsidiary of a foreign parent company can satisfy
the notice
requirement for
personal jurisdiction in Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988). The Court found that when
"service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and the Due
Process Clause, our inquiry ends." Id. at 707. The requirements for service and a
valid exercise of personal jurisdiction are, of course, incredibly different, but at least
in some situations the Court seemed willing to find due process was satisfied based
on activities involving an American subsidiary.
192. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754-58.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

866
there have .

.

[Vol. 82:833

. been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to

the liabilities sued on." 1 9 3 The Court also noted that specific
jurisdiction had become the crown jewel of the personal jurisdiction
analysis and was now in sharper focus than its sibling. 194 The Court
thus suggested that general jurisdiction was confined to situations
"traditionally recognized" for the exercise of dispute-blind
jurisdiction.1 9 5 As such, the Court noted that continuous activities in
the forum did not support dispute-blind jurisdiction; instead, the
contacts must be such that the defendant is "at home" in the forum
state.1 96
Against this backdrop, the court went on to assess the viability of
utilizing general jurisdiction to find personal jurisdiction over
Daimler based on Mercedes-Benz USA's contacts in California.
Assuming that Mercedes-Benz USA was at home in California 97 and
that its contacts were imputable to Daimler,198 the Court still

193. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); see Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at
754.
194. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755.
195. Id. at 757-58.
196. Id. at 751.
197. This is a big (and unhelpful) assumption. Mercedes-Benz USA had offices,
employees, and significant transactions in California. Id. at 752. It is unclear
whether the "at home" test would still provide general jurisdiction based on these
factors. The Court's refusal to clarify when a corporation is at home outside of the
state of incorporation and principal place of business leaves this question unclear.
198. Id. at 760. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign
corporation may be subjected to a court's general jurisdiction based on the contacts of
its in-state subsidiary. As noted above, at least six Circuits have held that .a
subsidiary's contacts with the forum can be imputed to the parent when the
subsidiary is so dominated by the parent as to be considered its alter ego. See supra
text accompanying note 189. The Ninth Circuit in Daimler had utilized an "agency
test," which looked to see whether the subsidiary performed services for the parent of
special importance such that the parent would have had to perform those services
itself if the subsidiary did not exist, plus the parent retained some right of control
over the subsidiary. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920-22 (9th
Cir. 2011). Under the facts of Daimler specifically, the Ninth Circuit had found that
Mercedes-Benz USA's services were important to Daimler since Daimler would be
ready to perform those services itself even if Mercedes-Benz USA did not exist or
would have found a new entity to do so. Id. at 922. The Court criticized this approach
as being too pro-jurisdiction in focus, as surely anything a corporation did through a
distributor the corporation would still need to do by other means if the subsidiary did
not exist. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759. However, the Court did not utilize this
opportunity to establish a test for determining when a subsidiary's contacts would be
imputed to its parent.
But it now seems clear that the agency test is moving towards becoming a
disfavored doctrine. Utilized only by the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit, a large
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determined that general jurisdiction would be inappropriate.1 99
Daimler's activities would need to be assessed in their entirety, at
both the national and international level, to determine where it
could truly be said to be "at home." 2 0 0 Harking back to Goodyear, the
Court noted that the fora in which general jurisdiction would
certainly be satisfied were the state of incorporation and principal
place of business and that neither of those bases were satisfied on
the facts of the case. 201 The court, however, went on to further clarify
that these two paradigmatic fora were not the only two places where
general jurisdiction might be appropriate. 202 Instead, the court
specifically noted that it did not
[F]oreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, see,
e.g., Perkins . . ., a corporation's operations in a forum other
than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of
business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to
render the corporation at home in that State. But this case
presents no occasion to explore that question, because

majority of circuits instead employ the alter ego test. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch

Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Estate of Thomson v. Toyota
Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Courts in this Circuit . .
have endorsed the use of the alter-ego theory to exercise personal jurisdiction.");

Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that
"personal jurisdiction can be based on ... the residential corporation . . . act[ing] as
the nonresidential corporate defendant's alter ego"); Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc.,

897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[a]lthough the mere existence of a
parent-subsidiary relationship will not support the assertion of jurisdiction over a
foreign parent," jurisdiction is warranted when the subsidiary is the alter-ego of the
parent); see also Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed
Opportunities in Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the
European Union Brussels I Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 13-14 (2014)
(noting that "a majority of U.S. lower courts . . . require that the corporations be ...
the 'alter ego' of each other"). Further, the Court's criticism of the agency test in
Daimler will surely only hasten its demise.

199.

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.

200. Id. at 762 n.20. The court noted that failing to do so would reduce the "at
home" inquiry to a mere synonym of the "doing business" approach utilized before
International Shoe. Id. Accordingly, under such an approach, Daimler would not
have the opportunity to structure its conduct in a way that would provide assurances
as to where it could and could not be subject to suit, a result the Court found
unacceptable. Id. at 761-62.

201.

Id. at 760-61.

202.

Id. at 761.
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Daimler's activities in California plainly do not approach that
level. 203

The Court also refused to consider the Asahi reasonableness
factors in its analysis.

20 4

The Court reasoned that a two-step

approach would be "superfluous" in cases of general jurisdiction-if
the corporation was truly at home in the forum, an exercise of
general jurisdiction would always be reasonable. 205 Pursuant to this
reasoning, the Court believed that a two-step analysis would be
inefficient and compound an "issue that should be resolved
expeditiously at the outset of litigation."206
The result from Daimler enshrines the test first put forth in
Goodyear-a general jurisdiction exists where defendants have
contacts in the forum such that the corporation is essentially at
home in the forum. 20 7 Such a standard is certainly met where the
corporation is incorporated and where it has its principal place of
business. 208 For the second time in five years, the Court referred to
these fora as the paradigmatic examples for the exercise of general
jurisdiction. 209 The Court also, however, referred to rare situations
where the defendant corporation might still be at home in the forum,
even if that forum was not the principal place of business or the
state of incorporation. 210 Continuing to use Perkins as the prime
example of this situation, the Court did not foreclose finding some
situations where operations in the forum state are so substantial
and of such a nature to render the corporation at home. 211 The Court
did nothing, however, to explain what facts outside of those present
in Perkinswould satisfy this standard.

203. Id. at 761 n.19.
204. Id. at 762 n.20.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011). As correctly noted by some lower courts, the standard utilized in Daimler was
simply a clarification of the standard adopted for the first time in Goodyear. See, e.g.,
Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2014)
(noting that Daimler "reaffirms that general jurisdiction extends beyond an entity's
state of incorporation and principal place of business only in the exceptional case
where its contacts with another forum are so substantial as to render it 'at home' in
that state") (emphasis added).
208. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 761 n.19.
211. Id.
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IV. THE JURISDICTIONAL TRISKELION

A. Defining the Triskelion
The language and analysis controlling our conceptions of general
jurisdiction have shifted radically in just a five-year period. Prior to
Goodyear, no courts and only a few commentators questioned that
continuous and systematic contacts sufficed for the exercise of
general jurisdiction. It seems clear now, however, that an
appropriate exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction requires contacts
far beyond those that are merely continuous, substantial, or
systematic. Indeed, Daimler and Goodyear now state that general
jurisdiction exists where a "corporation's affiliations with the State
in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive 'as to render
2 2
[it] essentially at home in the forum State."'

1

Of course, a major goal of the "at home" standard is to remove
uncertainty in jurisdictional analyses. A progressive view of general
jurisdiction would thus be to reject a loose balancing test and move
toward more categorical application. The Daimler Court in
particular suggests thinking about jurisdiction in categorical terms
by establishing principal place of business and state of incorporation
as exemplar bases of general jurisdiction. 213 The Court suggests that
no factors need be weighed to determine if general jurisdiction is
appropriate in those two fora-they are simply paradigmatic of a
corporate home. 214
The Daimler Court's interest in a categorical approach likely
stems from its concern about a corporation's ability "to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." 2 1 5
Principal place of business and state of incorporation have long been
advocated as models of general jurisdiction, 216 and these fora are
easy to identify. However, the Court did not limit general
jurisdiction to a wholly categorical analysis. Although the Court had

212. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (emphasis added)
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011)).
213. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19; Twitchell, supra note 1, at 669-70 (noting
that principal place of business, or the company's headquarters, is equivalent to an

individual's domicile, and that the state of incorporation provides an additional
"uniform home base").
214. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
215. Id. at 762 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1984)).
216. Twitchell, supra note 1, at 669.
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the opportunity to constrict general jurisdiction to state of
incorporation and principal place of business entirely, it specifically
created a third opportunity for general jurisdiction that does not
lend itself to rote application. The Court noted that it would exercise
general jurisdiction in unique situations, like Perkins, in which
contacts are "so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home." 2 17
The Court's language suggests that a factor-based analysis
remains a third possibility for the exercise of general jurisdiction,
but that this is separate from principal place of business and state of
incorporation. Thus, in re-conceptualizing general jurisdiction, it
may be helpful to think about dispute-blind jurisdiction as a
triskelion, possessing three separate but interrelated bases: state of
incorporation, principal place of business, and where, because of
unique circumstances, the defendant has so many contacts that it is
essentially "at home" in the style of Perkins. However, two things
remain missing. First, what factors are used to assess the third basis
for general jurisdiction? This basis is obviously not categorical, and
thus it must be determined how to assess its presence within unique
fact patterns. Additionally, what underlying theory makes the three
bases appropriate? If general jurisdiction is present in these fora, the
reason for its existence there must be explored.

B. The Missing Third Basis
In attempting to clarify the third basis of general jurisdiction,
the only guidance provided by Daimler comes from a bare reference
to Perkins.218 This, however, is wholly unhelpful. Perkins involved a
situation in which all of the foreign defendant's corporate activities
were being actively directed solely by the company's president from
within Ohio. 2 1 9 Specifically, the president supervised policies dealing
with the company's properties in the Philippines, dispatched funds
to cover the costs of rehabilitation, and made all corporate decisions
from Ohio. 220 As such, "[t]o the extent that the company was
conducting any business during and immediately after the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines, it was doing so in Ohio." 2 2 1 Thus, it
appears that in such a case, where all corporate management and
directives were centered in Ohio, that Ohio was, in fact, the principal

217. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
218. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014).
219. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
220. Id.
221. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856
(2011) (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48).
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place of business. 222 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself stated in
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine that Ohio constituted the "principal, if
temporary, place of business" of the defendant in Perkins.223 As such,
Perkins alone does not, and should not, define the third aspect of
general jurisdiction.
With Perkins providing relatively little guidance, the third basis
for general jurisdiction leaves unclear the nature of contacts that
will contribute to a finding of general jurisdiction. To explore this
issue, let us consider a fantasy fast food company, International
Fancy Eats. 22 4 It has its principal place of business and place of
incorporation in France, although it operates in seventeen countries,
including the United States. An American family is dining at an
International Fancy Eats at an airport in Mexico when the youngest
child slips, falls, and suffers a head injury due to the restaurant's
negligence. The child is severely injured and transported back to her
home in Texas. There are fifteen International Fancy Eats locations
in Texas, and the company maintains an office in Dallas to direct its
American operations. The company has hundreds, if not thousands,
of employees in Texas, and it derives substantial revenue from
Texas.
The question is now whether under an "at home" model of
general jurisdiction, the American victim in this accident can litigate
her claim in a domestic forum. Obtaining specific jurisdiction in the
United States is out of the question as the injury occurred abroad.
As such, general jurisdiction must be considered. Under a preDaimler, or really pre-Goodyear,225 model, it seems relatively clear

222. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. See, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181,
1184 (2010) (defining principal place of business as "where a corporation's officers
direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities").
223. 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984).
224. A similar situation to the hypothetical can be found in Meier v. Sun Int'l

Hotels, Ltd. 288 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002). In that case, a minor was injured while
snorkeling in the Bahamas after being struck by a commercial speedboat. Id. at
1267. The victim and his family brought suit in Florida against Bahamian
corporations affiliated with the hotel where the motorboat owner conducted business.

Id. at 1268. The defendants had their principal place of business and place of
incorporation in the Bahamas. Id. The Eleventh Circuit sustained a finding of
general jurisdiction because the defendants had bank accounts in the forum that
were handled by individuals in the Bahamas and engaged in extensive marketing

and booking services in the forum. Id. at 1268-74. This case was decided preDaimler; now, it seems clear that general jurisdiction would not have been
appropriate in Florida.
225. See Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 15
(D.D.C. 2014) (noting that the "at home" standard was announced in the Goodyear
case, not Daimler).
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that general jurisdiction over International Fancy Eats would have
been sustained in Texas-the company has physical offices in the
states, maintained employees there, and presumably conducted a
good deal of business in the state. This level of operations could
fairly be considered "continuous and systematic" contacts. 226
But applying the "at home" standard for general jurisdiction to
the above facts proves more complicated. The principal place of
business and place of incorporation for International Fancy Eats are
abroad; as such, these cannot serve as domestic bases for general
jurisdiction. The only possible way to sustain domestic jurisdiction is
thus to find that the contacts in this case fall within the third aspect
of the jurisdictional triskelion-namely, they illustrate a corporate
home in the vein of Perkins. Since Daimler, only one case has
sustained a finding of general jurisdiction despite the fact that the
principal place of business and state of incorporation were not in the
forum state. In Barriere v. Juluca,227 the court found that an
Anguillan corporation with its principal place of business in Anguilla
was subject to general jurisdiction in Florida under the third basis of
the jurisdictional triskelion-the corporation had Perkins-like
contacts suggesting that it was "at home" in the forum. 228
Specifically, the court found that the defendant maintained a sales
office in Florida, had an agent that managed its assets in Florida,
and promoted and made reservations in Florida, and thus could
fairly be characterized as "at home" in the forum. 229 The court noted
the undesirable result that the opposite conclusion would mandateAmerican citizens injured while vacationing in the Caribbean could
not bring suit in a domestic court against resorts having offices,
employees, bank accounts, and sales agents in the United States. 230
The Barriere court further explained that while Daimler
undoubtedly sought to limit the doctrine of general jurisdiction, the
court could not conceive that it was intended to "effectively deprive

226. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447
F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006). In Stubbs, the plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, was
injured at the Nassau Resort, a Nassau, Bahamas company. Id. at 1359. The
plaintiffs submitted evidence that Nassau Resort had been utilizing a corporate
office in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and that it conducted significant business in
Florida. Id. at 1364. The court found that general jurisdiction was appropriate based
on these facts. Id. Now, it seems relatively clear that Nassau Resort would not be
subject to general jurisdiction in Florida-these contacts would not rise to the level of
the corporation being "at home" in the forum.
227. No. 12-23510-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014).
228. Id. at 1-2.
229. Id. at 12.
230. Id. at 12-13.
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American citizens from litigating in the United States for virtually
all injuries that occur at foreign resorts maintained by foreign
defendants even where, as here, the corporations themselves
maintain an American sales office in Florida and heavily market in
the jurisdiction." 23 1 Other courts have not been as generous in the
post-Daimler wake. For example, in Air Tropiques, Sprl v. Northern
& Western Insurance Co., the court declined to find general
jurisdiction when a company maintained an administrative office
and employees in the forum. 232 The court specifically noted that
under a pre-Daimlerapproach, there most certainly would have been
general jurisdiction in the forum. 233 However, the court refused to
extend general jurisdiction based on the narrowed scope of the "at
home" standard.23 4 Other cases have also refused to extend general
jurisdiction after Daimler when there were only employees and
offices in the forum, finding that such factors did not suggest that
the defendant was "at home." 235

The International Fancy Eats hypothetical implicates the same
concerns raised in Barriere.2 36 If courts interpret the third aspect of
the jurisdictional triskelion too narrowly, the victim's only recourse
would be to bring suit against the company in Mexico or France,
resulting in massive expense and inconvenience to the victim and
her family, plus the uncertainty of navigating foreign law. The
failure to leave some basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction in
the United States will thus leave a jurisdictional gap and require
injured plaintiffs to litigate in a foreign forum despite a
multinational corporation's extensive and sophisticated U.S.
contacts. 237 Such a result is not only undesirable, but it also shields

231. Id. at 13.
232. No. CIV.A. H-13-1438 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014).
233. Id. at 19.
234. Id. at 20.
235. See, e.g., Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 390, 397-98 (D. Conn. 2014)
(stating that the defendant was not at home in the forum when it had 28 employees
in the forum, leased property with its name on the building, and had derived about
$160 million in revenue from the forum since 2008); cf. Gonzales v. Seadrill
Americas, Inc., 3:12-CV-00308, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2014) (stating that
the Mexican defendant was not at home in Texas when it did not have employees or
offices in the forum).
236. Barriere,No. 12-23510-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014).
237. In her concurrence in Daimler, Justice Sotomayer points out that this result
is especially strange when contrasted to how individuals are treated for jurisdictional
purposes. Daimler AG v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772-73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). Pursuant to Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Cty. of Marin, an
individual defendant whose only contact with a State is a one-time visit could be
subjected to the equivalent of general jurisdiction if the individual is served with
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multinational corporations from liability in the United States at the
same time that such companies are taking increasing advantage of
American markets.
V. ROUNDING OUT THE TRISKELION

A. A ProposedSolution
"Simple jurisdictional rules . . . promote greater predictability.
Predictability is valuable to corporations making business and
investment decisions." 238 This sentiment, expressed by the Court in
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, was surely the reason for the adoption of the
jurisdictional triskelion and what might be categorized as an
effective restriction of dispute-blind jurisdiction to principal place of
business and place of incorporation. The desire for simple
jurisdictional rules, however, does not ultimately mandate such a
limitation. The answer here is for the Court to identify the factors
that represent the third aspect of the jurisdictional triskelion beyond
a bare recitation to Perkins.
To marry the concerns of modern reality with traditional
conceptions about the limits of general jurisdiction present in
Perkins, a simple three-part test can be used to round out the third
aspect of the jurisdictional triskelion. Pursuant to this test, general
jurisdiction should be found to exist where (1) the company has
physical offices in the forum, (2) the company has employees in the
forum, and (3) those employees participate in the control and
direction of the corporation as a whole. Such a test comports with
considerations of simplicity and predictability while still assuring
jurisdiction in situations where sophisticated operations in the
United States or a particular state suggest that dispute-blind
jurisdiction would be appropriate.
First, the requirement of a company maintaining a physical
office in the desired forum has long been a hallmark of general
jurisdiction. 239 Even the Court in Perkins noted that the defendant

process during that visit. 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990). Strangely, a multinational
corporation like International Fancy Eats that owns property, employs workers, and

does billions of dollars' worth of business in the State will not be subject to general
jurisdiction if that state is not its principal place of business or its place of
incorporation.

238.

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010).

239. There are many cases in which physical presence in the forum is discussed
in the context of general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380

F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2004) (looking at the presence of retail stores in the
jurisdiction); In re Rationis Enters. Inc. of Pan., 261 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2001)
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"maintained an office" in the forum, 240 and a lack of similar physical
facilities was at issue in Helicopteros.241 A physical office in the state
also communicates something about a corporation's intent to engage
with the forum-by establishing an office, the corporation has
voluntarily established a close connection with the state. The
corporation is now subject to additional taxes and state laws that it
would not be if it just entered into transactions in the forum.
Additionally, practical considerations are at play. The presence or
absence of a physical office can be determined and presented to the
court fairly easily and would not require significant fact-finding.
Further, the requirement of physical presence would ensure
companies have some reasonable assurance about where they could
be subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction. Since foreseeability was a
critical concern in Daimler,242 this advantage is particularly
relevant.
Concerns regarding the relationship between Internet-based
presence and general jurisdiction also mandate that physical
operations or offices in the forum be considered. In 2002, the District
of Columbia Circuit applied the "continuous and systematic" test to
determine that Ameritrade Holding Corporation could be subject to
general jurisdiction in Washington, D.C., despite the company
having no physical facilities or employees in the forum. 24 3 The court
based its reasoning on Ameritrade's ability to conduct online
business with its D.C.-based customers, including transferring funds
to their accounts, entering binding contracts, and using accounts to
buy and sell securities. 244 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found general

(considering presence of local office in New Jersey).
240. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
241. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 411 (1984).
242. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761-62 (2014).

243.

Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

244. Id. at 512-13. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits had also previously accepted
that Internet-based contacts could give rise to general jurisdiction. Even though
those Circuits rejected jurisdiction based on the "passive" nature of the websites in
question, they readily accepted that Internet activity could give rise to dispute-blind
jurisdiction if the transactions and contacts in question were sufficient. See Mink v.

AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that "the presence of an
electronic mail access, a printable order form, and a toll-free phone number on a
website, without more, is insufficient to establish [general] jurisdiction"); Soma Med.

Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that
maintaining a website that simply conveys information does not subject corporation
to general jurisdiction in a forum). Although these cases seem to accept the notion
that Internet contacts alone can serve as the basis for general jurisdiction, this
Article believes that considerations of international comity require limiting disputeblind jurisdiction to situations where there is a physical office. Such an approach is
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jurisdiction over a company that operated a sophisticated virtual
store in the forum but did not have employees or physical facilities
in the state.24 5 Continuing in this vein would surely subject far too
many companies to general jurisdiction, as the proliferation of webbased commerce has resulted in more marketplaces being moved
online and more companies operating "globally" through the
Internet. 246 Further, extending general jurisdiction to situations
without a physical office in the forum may also implicate concerns of
international comity and relationships if foreign businesses fear that
maintenance of an Internet website alone will subject them to
dispute-blind jurisdiction in American courts. Indeed, a major issue
raised in Daimler was that an expansion of general jurisdiction by
the United States would threaten agreements with other nations
regarding the enforcement of U.S. judgments. 247 As such, the
requirement of a physical office in the forum works to ensure that
dispute-blind jurisdiction is limited to situations where companies
have purposefully and specifically encroached into the forum in the
same manner as other forum insiders.
In addition to considering physical facilities in the forum, the
presence or absence of employees should also be utilized to assess
general jurisdiction. The existence of employees in a jurisdiction has
long been a factor seriously considered by the Supreme Court and
lower courts in assessing the presence of general jurisdiction.248
Courts have, however, rejected the notion that the mere presence of
employees in the forum state alone, especially if they serve as sales

consistent with the more careful application of general jurisdiction suggested by the
"at home" standard. See Megan M. La Belle, The Future of Internet-Related Personal
JurisdictionAfter Goodyear Dunlap Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre v. Nicastro, 15 J.
INTERNET L. 3, 8 (2012) (stating that Goodyear was meant to narrow the doctrine of
general jurisdiction and that the reasoning of Ameritrade likely did not survive that
case); see also Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home" in Goodyear
Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 545 (2012) (stating that Goodyear should foreclose
finding general jurisdiction based on Internet activities).
245. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003),
reh'g en banc, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the website in question was
highly interactive, very extensive, and generated millions in revenue).
246. See James R. Pielemeier, Why General Personal Jurisdictionover "Virtual
Stores"Is a Bad Idea, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 625, 667 (2009) (arguing that allowing
general jurisdiction over companies based on Internet websites will drastically
increase forum shopping and increasingly raise complicated choice of law issues).
247. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
248. Id. ("The Solicitor General informs us, in this regard, that foreign
governments' objections to some domestic courts' expansive views of general
jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of international agreements on
the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments." (citation omitted)).
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representatives, can mandate the exercise of general jurisdiction.2 49
For example, the First Circuit twice rejected general jurisdiction in
situations where the defendant was employing either six or eight
employees in the forum and whose only job was to solicit and accept
orders. 250 The Ninth Circuit went so far as to state that "no court has
ever held that the maintenance of even a substantial sales force
within the state is a sufficient contact to assert [general]
jurisdiction." 251
Although the presence of employees alone has never been enough
to confer general jurisdiction, the combination of employees and a
local office has historically proven more potent. The Supreme Court
has long considered that employees working in a company's physical
office in the forum contribute substantially to the jurisdictional
analysis. For example, a hallmark characteristic of Perkins is that
the company's President and two secretaries were employed at the
defendant's Ohio office. 25 2 Years later, in declining to find general

jurisdiction, the Court noted in Helicopteros that the defendant
never maintained employees in Texas, nor did it maintain an
office. 253 Such considerations make good sense. Much like a physical
office, the existence of employees stationed in a forum is a simple
matter of corporate record and will not require extensive fact-finding
or subject a corporation to uncertainty-either there are employees
in the forum or there are not. Further, the presence of employees
working at an office in the forum suggests that the corporation is
purposefully engaging with the economic, regulatory, and political
power of the forum state. Maintaining employeeS 254 in the forum

249. This includes the Supreme Court in People's Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918) (holding, prior to InternationalShoe, that the presence of
sales agents in the forum alone did not result in personal jurisdiction).
250. See Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 1984) (denying
personal jurisdiction when defendant's only contacts with the state were its eight
sales representatives); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 587 (1st Cir.
1970) ("When, however, defendant's only activities consist of advertising and
employing salesmen to solicit orders, we think that fairness will not permit a state to
assume jurisdiction."). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit rejected general jurisdiction
when the defendant employed twenty-one employees in the forum but did not have a
physical office. Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir. 1993).
251. Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir.
1984).
252. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
253. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 411 (1984).
254. It is also worth noting that the term "employees" should not be construed to
extend beyond its generally accepted meaning-individuals directly employed by the
company in question, not independent distributors. At least one circuit has
previously predicated general jurisdiction on distribution networks, as opposed to
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means that the corporation is subject to state laws regarding
working conditions, minimum wage, diversity, and insurance, among
other things. The corporation's voluntary submission to the power of
the state in this way, and its choice to maintain the state's legal
standards, are valid considerations in determining whether the state
is a corporate "home."
Finally, the last critical step of determining whether a
corporation is at home in the forum should be whether the
employees in the forum participate in the control and management
of the corporation as a whole. This factor is drawn directly from
Perkins. In that case, the Court explicitly mentioned that the
company's President was acting as general manager in the forum
and engaging in traditional management functions, including
corresponding on behalf of the company, overseeing operations,
hosting board meetings, and, most importantly, directing company
policy. 2 5 5 The Court's recitation of these management activities
suggests that the type of work being done in the forum is a critical
component of general jurisdiction, which is in keeping with a
qualitative, as opposed to revenue-based or quantitative, approach to
the inquiry.
Surprisingly, few lower courts or commentators have explicitly
considered the importance of management or supervisory direction
in the jurisdictional inquiry. When the presence of management has
been discussed, it has been done primarily by factually analogizing
to Perkins. For example, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Robertson-Ceco Corp., the Second Circuit compared the facts of the
case to Perkins in the following way: "Many cases, including this one,

actual employees. For example, in LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., the
defendant employed multiple distributors in Ohio to move its goods. 232 F.3d 1369,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Federal Circuit found that the presence of these
distributors created general jurisdiction in the forum. Id. at 1375. However,
employing independent distributors in a forum should not subject a company to
general jurisdiction. Such an action is akin only to doing business with forum
residents and does not suggest that the corporation has attempted to make itself at
home in the forum. Additionally, independent distributors do not have the ability to
contract on behalf of the company or represent the company's interest. See Jayne v.
Royal Jordanian Airlines Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that a
company's in-state agents must have authority to enter into agreements on behalf of
the corporation for general jurisdiction to exist). As such, they do not represent the
kind of activities in the state that would lead to a finding of general jurisdiction. See
Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1125
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding that when a foreign company has an independent distributor
in the forum, "it is clear that [the company] has stepped through the door, [but] there
is no indication that it has sat down and made itself at home").
255. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
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fall between Perkins and Helicopteros. [U]nlike the defendant in
Perkins, Robertson certainly did not use Vermont as a central office
location for supervisory activities." 256 This statement suggests that
the court recognized the importance of a supervisory function in the
forum in Perkins. In In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New
York, Inc., the Second Circuit again referenced Perkins by noting
that, unlike in Perkins, the defendant did not have management in
the forum.25 7 Only a few other courts also referred to Perkins as
involving "managerial" or "board" action in the forum. 258
Despite the dearth of previous authority on this subject,
requiring the presence of corporate management in the forum makes
good sense. Of course, corporate management should be read to
involve high-level corporate decision making, i.e., shaping the
corporation's policy, mission, and directives. Making these high-level
decisions in the forum suggests that the corporation has made itself
"at home" by relying on the forum to further the existence of its
corporate objectives and policies. 259
Further, the management requirement works to separate the
forum from others where the defendant has mere continuous
contacts. The Daimler Court noted that extending general
jurisdiction in fora where there are sizable sales or facilities led to
exorbitant exercises of dispute-blind jurisdiction, well beyond what
other nations considered appropriate. 260 The Court appeared
particularly interested in preventing large corporations from being
subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in every state because of the
presence of at least some contacts in each forum. Previous cases cast
light on this concern. For example, in Bryant v. Finnish National
Airline,261 the court sustained a finding of general jurisdiction over a
large foreign airline based on a one-and-a-half room office that

256.
257.

84 F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir. 1996).
745 F.3d 30, 40 (2d Cir. 2014).

258. Similarly, the court in ConstruccionesIntegrales del Carmen, SA.A de C.V
v. Goodcrane Corp., analogized to Perkins by noting that, unlike in Perkins "board
business" was not conducted in the forum. No. CIV A H-08-3427, slip op. at 10 (S.D.

Tex. June 30, 2009); see also Gossett v. HBL, LLC, No. CIV.A.2:06-123-CWH, slip op.
at 5 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (noting that the Perkins Court held general jurisdiction
applied over a company that carried on "managerial decisions" in forum state).
259. See Cebik, supra note 4, at 38 (stating that when a corporation makes policy
in a forum, the "corporation has accepted the privilege of maintaining its existence
within a particular state and looks to the state to . . . define its rights and duties in
terms of the kinds of decisions it can make within the state, the laws which govern
the activities of its agents, and other rights and duties central to the functioning of
the corporation").
260. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).

261.

208 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1965).
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employed three full-time employees. 262 Such contacts were
apparently very minor when compared with the global operations of
the defendant, and yet were sufficient for continuous and systematic
contacts. 2 63 Under this reasoning, any physical office with
employees, no matter how insignificant in comparison to the
corporate whole, could create general jurisdiction.
But utilizing management as a proxy for high-quality corporate
contacts meets the Daimler Court's goal of ensuring that a corporate
home is distinct from other locations where the corporation is merely
doing busineSS 264-i.e., entering into transactions, maintaining bank
accounts, or negotiating contracts. If a corporation makes high-level
policy or management decisions in the forum, this serves to
differentiate that forum from others where there are merely offices
or large volumes of sales. The quality of the contacts in such a
situation is thus quite high. Instead of focusing on normal corporate
activities in a forum, like sales or bank accounts, the analysis shifts
to address situations where the corporation is taking steps to further
its own unique existence and objectives. Further, it is unlikely that
even large multinational corporations will keep executive decision
makers in more than a few fora, thus preventing dispute-blind
jurisdiction from spreading across the nation. But if a corporation
chooses to station its decision makers within a state, plus maintain
an office with employees in that location, it should be said to be at
home.
B. Utilizing the New Approach
1. Practical Advantages
The approach to the third basis of general jurisdiction outlined
above has several distinct advantages, but it gains its first
advantage simply by leaving something out-a quantitative
approach to jurisdiction. Courts have long assessed general
jurisdiction by looking in part at quantity: quantity of sales, quantity
of revenue, or quantity of transactions. Such an analysis was critical
in the era of continuous and systematic contacts, but this approach
can confuse a corporation's decision to do business in the forum with
its decision to do business with residents of the forum. Or, as the
Fifth Circuit put it, "in order to confer general jurisdiction a
defendant must have a business presence in Texas. It is not enough

262.
263.
264.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 441.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62.
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do business with Texas."26 5 A quantitative

analysis focusing on large dollars of revenue can conflate doing
business with individuals within a forum with meaningful contacts
with the forum itself.2 6 6 Indeed, a solely quantitative analysis has
been criticized as producing inconsistent results based on methods of
calculating revenue and subjecting corporations to uncertainties as
to what level of revenue will create general jurisdiction. 267 An
approach to jurisdiction that considers the quality of contacts,
instead of the sheer quantity, avoids such problems and provides
clarity for both courts and corporations.
Additionally, the approach outlined above has less impact on
international relationships than the previous "continuous and
systematic" approach, yet does not completely abandon the
possibility of a domestic forum. Scholars have consistently argued
that American conceptions about the availability of jurisdiction are
out of line with those of other nations and that general jurisdiction
should be constricted to simply the principal place of business and
the state of incorporation, or abolished completely. 268 The word
"exorbitant" has been closely associated with "doing business" or
general jurisdiction. A report prepared in conjunction with the
Hague Judgment Convention listed "doing business" jurisdiction on
its blacklist of "exorbitant" exercises of jurisdiction, and dozens of
scholars have used the term to disparage American conceptions of
general jurisdiction. 2 69 Objections center on the ability of the
doctrine to create jurisdictional power in fora that do not bear a
sufficient relationship with the circumstances of the case and to
operate as a fail-safe to ensure that American courts can always
exercise some sort of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.

265. Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 611 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted).
266. See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co.,
284 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "engaging in commerce with
residents of the forum state. is not in and of itself the kind of activity that
approximates physical presence within the state's borders"); Kadala v. Cunard Lines,
Ltd., 589 N.E. 2d 802, 807-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (denying jurisdiction when
defendant spent $500,000 on newspaper advertisements in forum state because this
failed the "transaction of business" test under the Illinois long-arm statute).
267. Tarin & Macchiaroli, supra note 112, at 61.
268. Kevin M. Clermont & John R. B. Palmer, ExorbitantJurisdiction,58 ME. L.
REV. 474, 481-82 (2006); Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of JurisdictionalRules and
Recognition Practice on InternationalBusiness Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26
Hous. J. INT'L L. 327, 351 (2004).
269. Catherine Kessedjian, InternationalJurisdictionand Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Preliminary Document No. 7, at 41,
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pd7.pdf.
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Additionally, the operation of dispute-blind jurisdiction in American
courts has been blamed for the United States' inability to negotiate a
multi-lateral treaty on the recognition of judgments at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. 2 7 0

The Daimler Court was
particularly concerned
with
international repercussions emanating from its decision and
specifically cited the European Union's approach to dispute-blind
jurisdiction contained in Regulation 1215/2012 for the proposition
that general jurisdiction under the "continuous and systematic"
standard had exceeded appropriate bounds. 271 The E.U. model of
general jurisdiction states that a company is subject to general
jurisdiction in the nations of the European Union where it is
incorporated, has its principal place of business, or has its central
administration. 272 The Daimler Court suggested that such a
provision displayed appropriate constraint in the exercise of general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 273
Oddly enough, the European Union's approach actually fails to
limit European nations in their exercise of general jurisdiction over
non-E.U. defendants. Regulation 1215/2012 maintains that
jurisdiction over non-E.U. defendants will still be determined by
individual national laws, which in some cases allow for exercises of
general jurisdiction in situations that require few contacts on the

&

270. Proposed Hague Treaty Said to Be Burdened by New Language Needed to
Attract Support, 72 U.S. L. WK. 2719, 2719 (2004); see also Linda J. Silberman
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALL Herein of Foreign Country
Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 642
(2000) (noting that the United States' "doing business" jurisdiction may be a dealbreaker at the Hague). Other commentators suggested that it was actually differing
approaches to dispute-specific jurisdiction that resulted in the treaty's failure. See,
e.g., Ronald A. Brand, JurisdictionalDevelopments and the New Hague Judgments
Project, in A COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
HANS VAN LOON 89, 99 (2013) ("While the direction of the Brussels I Regulation and
Recast Regulation has focused on the rights of the plaintiff, . . . the United States
Supreme Court has focused on the interests of the defendant."). But even if that is
the case, general jurisdiction has long been blamed for the refusal of other nations to
recognize U.S. judgments.
271. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
272. Council Regulation 1215/2012, arts. 4(1) and 63(1), 2012 O.J. (L351).
Specifically, the European Union allows dispute-blind jurisdiction where a company
is domiciled. Id. at art. 4(1). Domicile is then defined as the statutory seat, principal
place of business, and central administration. Id. at art. 63(1). These provisions were
the result of compromises that supported narrower jurisdictional rules in favor of
widespread recognition of judgments across the E.U. Borchers, supra note 198, at 16.
The provisions of this regulation will go into effect in 2015. Id. at 5.
273. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
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part of the defendant. 274 Accordingly, it is not clear that Regulation
1215/2012 actually represents a limited and more predictable model
of general jurisdiction-foreign corporations could be subject to fairly
liberal exercises of general jurisdiction in the European Union
despite Regulation 1215/2012. For example, Article 23 of the
German Code of Civil Procedure allows for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over any company that owns assets in Germany,
regardless of the value of those assets, as long as there is some kind
of additional contact with Germany. 275 Thus, a United States
company with a manufacturing plant, office, bank account, or any
asset in Germany might be subject to jurisdiction in Germany for a
dispute that arose anywhere. This would suggest that the American
model of general jurisdiction post-Daimler and Goodyear is far
narrower in the context of foreign corporations than the approach
employed by the European Union. Maintaining a third basis of
general jurisdiction should thus not implicate international comity
as limiting general jurisdiction to states with offices, employees, and
management is narrow, predictable, and should comport with
defendants' reasonable expectations.
Finally, even if one limits their inquiry to only intra-E.U.
jurisdictional decisions, the suggested third basis for general
jurisdiction is still on par with the European approach. Regulation
1215/2012 suggests that dispute-blind jurisdiction is appropriate in
unique fora related to the central management or existence of the
corporation. 276 This analysis recognizes that fora containing
corporate decision makers represent the equivalent of a domicile.
Accordingly, the quality of the defendant's relationship with the
forum is central to the exercise of general jurisdiction in the
European Union. Allowing American courts to exercise general
jurisdiction where the company maintains an office, employees, and
policy-makers incorporates the same limitations by insisting that the
presence of corporate policy or management is the crux of the
analysis. This ensures that only the few fora from which the
corporation directs its existence serve as additional corporate
"homes."

274. Borchers, supra note 198, at 17; Peter Hay, Notes on the European Union's
Brussels-I "Recast" Regulation: An American Perspective, 2013 EUR. LEGAL F. 1, 2
(2013).
275. Brand, supra note 270, at 97. See also ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], § 23, translationat http://www.gesetze-im-internet.del

englisch-zpoenglisch-zpo.html (Ger.) (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
276. Council Regulation 1215/2012, arts. 4(1) and 63(1), 2012 O.J. (L351).
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2. A Marriage of Function and Policy
Defining the third basis for general jurisdiction as fora that
contain an office, employees, and corporate policy or management
also comports with theoretical considerations guiding general
jurisdiction. Scholars have traditionally identified fairness and
territoriality as fundamental theoretical principles that support a
doctrine of dispute-blind jurisdiction. 277 While to date the Court has
failed to clarify which policy 27 8 actually sustains dispute-blind
jurisdiction, some general observations can be made.
First, considerations of fairness have long been discussed in
connection with general jurisdiction. The language of International
Shoe suggested that all exercises of personal jurisdiction were based
on notions of fairness and fundamental justice arising from the Due
Process Clause. 279 The Court went on to adopt relatively bold
language in a number of specific jurisdiction cases espousing notions
of fairness in connection with the exercise of personal jurisdiction
generally. For example, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee,2 80 the Court noted that the "personal
jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." 28 1 Of
course, the Court refused to find that fairness overcame sovereignty
in its totality.282 Instead, the Court suggested that sovereignty was

277. Rhodes, supra note 2, at 902-03 (noting that concerns of sovereignty and
fairness have characterized the search for a theoretical basis for general jurisdiction,
but characterizing the search for a theoretical basis as "quixotic"); see also Cebik,
supra note 4, at 14 (identifying fairness and sovereignty as competing rationales for
general jurisdiction).
278. Andrews, supra note 4, at 1012 (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to
identify a cohesive policy for personal jurisdiction and identifying a wide range of
factors previously cited, including "sovereignty, convenience, predictability, a balance
of benefits and burdens, plaintiffs' interests, judicial efficiency, and substantive
policies").
279. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (noting that although
personal jurisdiction was traditionally grounded in notions of territoriality, "due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice"').
280. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
281. Id. at 702.
282. Id. at 703 ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents
first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.").
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an element of the due process analysis, not an independent
restriction on jurisdiction. 283
The fairness rationale applied in the context of general
jurisdiction is seen in the lower court's use of fundamental fairness
factors. This was accomplished through the Asahi analysis, which
balanced the interests of the parties and the forum with wider social
and judicial inquiry.28 4 Structuring general jurisdiction as a two-part
plus
contacts
and
systematic
continuous
i.e.,
analysis,
fora
that
contained
that
even
factors,
meant
reasonableness
sufficient contacts might not be able to exercise general jurisdiction
if it would work extreme hardship on the defendant.2 8 5 Unless the
appropriate relationship and allocation of burdens existed between
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, many lower courts
would have thus declined jurisdiction.
This focus on fairness and reasonableness made good sense.
However, the Court in Daimler dispelled this notion by determining
that the reasonableness factors were inapplicable in the context of
general jurisdiction. 286 The Daimler Court noted that, unlike specific
jurisdiction, general jurisdiction "has not been stretched beyond
limits traditionally recognized." 28 7 This suggests that while specific
jurisdiction has developed in light of considerations of fairness,
and relationship with the forum, general
reasonableness,
jurisdiction is premised on traditional considerations of presence and
the power of the state.288 Such an approach is already seen in the
context of general jurisdiction over individuals. Pursuant to Milliken
v. Meyer, an individual is subject to the equivalent of general

283.

Id. at 702-03 n.10.

284. Eng, supra note 4, at 873 (noting the importance and widespread use of the
reasonableness and fairness factors to assess general jurisdiction).

285.

See, e.g., Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 1993) (not reaching the issue of contacts necessary to sustain general
jurisdiction because application of reasonableness factors showed jurisdiction in the
forum to be inappropriate); United States v. MIV MANDAN, 774 F. Supp. 410, 418
(E.D. La. 1991) (noting that even if contacts were continuous and systematic, general
jurisdiction would still be unreasonable); Neilson v. Budget Rent A Car Int'l, Inc.,

(E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1988) (finding contacts satisfied but noting the need to address
reasonableness factors).
286. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014) ("When a
corporation is genuinely at home in the forum State, however, any second-step
inquiry would be superfluous"). The Court here seemed to suggest that a corporation
that was truly at home in the forum would have no need for a reasonableness
inquiry. Id.

287.
288.

Id. at 749.
Id. at 763.
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jurisdiction in the state of his domicile. 289 This exercise of power is
based on the rights, duties, and privileges an individual receives
from his domicile-he is afforded privileges of state citizenship and
protections to his property, leaving the state free to exact reciprocal
duties over that individual. 290 Additionally, the individual has made
himself a member of the state community that must abide by state
law and looks to the state for organization and enforcement of his
rights.291 This interplay between duty, participation, and rights
gives the state and individual a heightened relationship that cannot
be matched by other fora, thus making dispute-blind jurisdiction
appropriate. Surely if such rationales are accepted in the context of
individuals, they can be appropriated for determining general
jurisdiction over corporations. Thus, corporations that have formed
the equivalent of a domicile in a forum should be subject to general
jurisdiction in the courts of that state.
The Daimler Court's choice of paradigmatic fora is also indicative
of a state citizenship approach. The state of incorporation and
principal place of business have been previously defined by the
Court as corporate domiciles. 292 Naming these two fora as locations
where dispute-blind jurisdiction is appropriate communicates that
the Court considers citizenship critical to the analysis. 293 But by
leaving open a third basis for general jurisdiction, the Court further
suggests that state of incorporation and principal place of business
294
are not the only locations in which the corporation is a citizen.
Determining how to calculate corporate citizenship for the purposes
of general jurisdiction is critical to ascertaining in what situations
such jurisdiction will be appropriate.
In the context of general jurisdiction, corporate citizenship
should be based on where the corporation chooses to engage in
activities that direct the corporate existence. State of incorporation
is illustrative of this reasoning. The laws of the state of
incorporation define the rights and responsibilities of the
corporation. By choosing to incorporate in a particular state, the
corporation has decided to allow the laws of that state to further and
direct its existence-the activities and governance of the corporation
29 5
will always be dependent on the law of the state of incorporation.
Similarly, the principal place of business is the location from which

289. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 463-64.
292. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1188-90 (2010).
293. See id.
294. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014).
295. See Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463.
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the corporate objective and directives emanate. 296 The corporation
has chosen to place its "nerve center" in the forum and has subjected
its principal office and decision makers to the laws of the state.2 9 7
This represents a voluntary choice to direct the corporation from this
forum while being subject to the laws, obligations, and benefits of
the forum.
Further, the Court's identified paradigms suggest that quality of
contacts is truly at issue in the general jurisdiction analysis. The
quantity of corporate involvement in the state is irrelevant for
determining citizenship. 298 A corporation might have $100 million in
transactions in one state plus several bank accounts, and yet such
contacts do not signify that the corporation is a citizen there. The
corporation has not subjected its existence or overall direction to a
state in which it merely enters transactions or maintains bank
accounts. However, a corporation has subjected its existence to a
state that meets the proposed third basis for general jurisdiction. A
forum that contains an office, employees, and corporate decision
makers is a location from which the corporation is directing key
activities and furthering the corporate existence. 299 These are high
quality contacts that signify a substantial commitment to the forum
in the form of corporate citizenship.
3. The Test at Work
For all of its advantages, there is, of course, no point defining the
third basis of general jurisdiction in such a way that makes its
application merely theoretical. The test must be able to be applied in
situations that actually occur and make sense. The question is as
follows: When does the third basis of general jurisdiction produce
acceptable results?
It's easier to start with the negative. Applying the third basis for
general jurisdiction eliminates a great number of cases that produce
undesirable results under the continuous and systematic standard.
For example, in United Rope Distributors,Inc. v. Kimberly Line, the
court determined that a foreign corporation could be subject to
general jurisdiction in New York because its agent there maintained
a corporate bank account that the corporation could access. 300 The
court reasoned that the maintenance of this bank account

296. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192.
297. See id. at 1193; Cebik, supra note 4, at 38.
298. See supranote 112 and accompanying text.
299. Cebik, supranote 4, at 37.
300. United Rope Distribs., Inc. v. Kimberly Line, 770 F. Supp. 128, 132-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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constituted continuous and systematic contacts with New York
because the bank account constituted all of the company's profits. 30
Additional cases assessed factors like the presence of bank
accounts, 302 part-time sales solicitors, 303 telephone listings, and
websiteS 304 to sustain general jurisdiction. Such cases were criticized
for subjecting foreign companies to general jurisdiction based on
relatively mundane activities within the forum.3 0
The jurisdictional triskelion will no longer allow results like
these. Limiting general jurisdiction to state of incorporation,
principal place of business, and situations where there is an office,
employees, and management in the forum prevents exercises of
general jurisdiction based on insignificant or uncertain forum
contacts. For example, situations in which executive officers are in
residence at a forum office should sustain a finding that the
corporation is at home in the forum.306 The presence of an American
headquarters or division office may also indicate that the corporation
is performing policy-making or high-level decision making in the
forum.3 0 7 Courts have previously been comfortable considering such

301. Id. But see Nat'l Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 425 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (stating that "isolated act of maintaining bank accounts [in New York] has
been held not to constitute doing business"); Fremay, Inc. v. Modern Plastic Mach.
Corp., 222 N.Y.S.2d 694, 700 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (stating that "existence of a bank
account in New York by itself is not sufficient").
302. See United Rope Distribs., Inc., 770 F. Supp at 132-33.
303. See Mich. Nat'l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir.
1989).
304. See U.S. ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., 952 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.D.C.
2013).
305. Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague
Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1295 (1998). The court in
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Intl, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 853-4 (N.Y. 1967), was similarly
criticized for finding general jurisdiction in New York over a U.K. company that had
a bank account in the forum and utilized an agent to take hotel reservations. Zekoll,
supra note 306, at 1294.
306. See, e.g., I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Wakefield Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d
1254, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that general jurisdiction was appropriate when
corporate officer responsible for key corporate decisions had an office in the forum);
Orefice v. Laurelview Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 66 F.R.D. 136, 139-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(foreign corporation whose agent was performing managerial duties in the forum
amenable to general jurisdiction).
307. See Swiss Marine Servs. S.A. v. Louis Dreyfus Energy Servs. L.P., 598 F.
Supp. 2d 414, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that general jurisdiction existed over the
defendant in Connecticut, where it had its principal North American office); In re
Parmalat Secs. Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding general
jurisdiction over foreign company in North Carolina because it was being managed
and supervised from there).
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issues under the continuous and systematic standard and should be
3 08
prepared to do so under the "at home" standard as well.

Returning to the International Fancy Eats hypothetical posed
above brings the third basis for general jurisdiction into clear
focuS. 309 In that situation, an American victim of an injury, which

occurred abroad in Mexico, was attempting to gain general
jurisdiction in Texas over the defendant, which was incorporated
and maintained its principal place of business in France. Texas is
home to fifteen retail locations operated by the corporation, an office
directing American operations, and hundreds of corporate
employees. Applying the jurisdictional triskelion is fairly easy here.
The corporation will be subject to general jurisdiction where its
contacts suggest that it is at home in the forum. The first two bases
of at home jurisdiction are not at issue-the company is neither
incorporated nor has a principal place of business in Texas. But
application of the third basis reveals that the company is subject to
general jurisdiction in the forum. It maintains offices and employees
in the forum. Most importantly, it probably also maintains corporate
decision makers in Texas. Its principal American office likely
contains officers or executives who help designate corporate
objectives and set corporate policy. The American victim now has a
domestic forum for her litigation. 3 10

308. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Secs., LLC, No. 05 CIV. 9016(SAS), 2006 WL 708470, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2006)
(Cayman Islands company subject to general jurisdiction in New York where it
maintained a managing director and the Director of International Fund Services);
Romero v. Argentinas, 834 F. Supp. 673, 680 (D.N.J. 1993) (foreign company not
subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in New Jersey when American headquarters was
located in New York).
309. See infra Part IV, B.
310. Remember the hypothetical that Justice Sotomayor posed in Daimler? She
asked: "Suppose a company divides its management functions equally among three
offices in different States, with one office nominally deemed the company's corporate
headquarters. If the State where the headquarters is located can exercise general
jurisdiction, why should the other two States be constitutionally forbidden to do the
same?" Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
The answer is: they should not be. Under the proposed test for the third
basis of general jurisdiction, the states that contained corporate management would
have the power to exercise general jurisdiction regardless of which one was labeled
the "headquarters." The proposed test thus prevents a corporation from utilizing
mere nomenclature to avoid jurisdiction. If the corporation is truly conducting highlevel decision making in multiple fora, it should be subject to general jurisdiction in
those fora.

890

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:833

While it is certainly time to put aside inflated applications of
general jurisdiction a la continuous and systematic contacts, the
result described above is a good one. General jurisdiction has long
been predicated on availability and the notion that individuals and
entities should not be able to escape dispute-blind jurisdiction in fora
with which they have heightened relationships.3 1 1 In the context of
domestic corporations, the growth of specific jurisdiction has
provided a plethora of jurisdictional options-a plaintiff may litigate
where the injury occurred, or, pursuant to general jurisdiction, at
the principal place of business or state of incorporation, without
leaving the comfort of the American judicial system. 3 12 But refusing
to recognize dispute-blind jurisdiction in states where corporations
are ultimately operating as state citizens would destroy
jurisdictional
availability in the context of transnational
corporations. Such a result would serve particular injustice as more
companies choose to incorporate and maintain their headquarters
abroad while retaining significant U.S. operations. 313 Allowing
corporations to wholly shield themselves behind national borders
while maintaining the ability to engage in the U.S. market and
station critical managers in the United States does not promote any
useful end. But a fully-formed third basis for general jurisdiction
helps preserve jurisdictional availability and refuses to shield
corporations from general jurisdiction in all domestic fora even when
critical decision makers are stationed in the U.S.
CONCLUSION

The post-Goodyear and Daimler "at home" approach to general
jurisdiction signifies the Court's apparent attempt to constrain

311.

See Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir. 1993)

(stating that general jurisdiction "functioned primarily to ensure that a forum was
available for plaintiffs to bring their claims").
312. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 72, at 1178-79.
313. Indeed, it appears more companies are attempting to move operations
overseas in order to avoid U.S. taxes. Robert Weisman et al, More US Firms Chase
Mergers that Yield Overseas Address, BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 2014, available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/07/12/resistance-growing-practicecompanies-switching-headquarters-abroad-for-tax-purposes/Ew7SterXgo9LEvSzy
7UgTJ/story.html (noting a think tank's comment that it is becoming increasingly
disadvantageous to be a U.S.-based multinational corporation; the solution is thus to
"stop being a U.S.-based multinational"). Many of these corporations still maintain
U.S. offices that host high-level corporate executives. Id. It would seem unwise to
allow corporations to move their global headquarters or incorporate abroad and

retain high-level officers in the U.S. without being subject to general jurisdiction.
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unpredictable applications of the doctrine under the "continuous and
systematic" model employed in the lower courts. To think about
applications of general jurisdiction in the new era, it is helpful to
ascertain three bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction. The
first two, state of incorporation and principal place of business, have
long been paradigmatic of dispute-blind jurisdiction in the corporate
context. Indeed, it has been widely accepted that the corporation is a
citizen or domiciliary of the states in which it is incorporated and
maintains its headquarters. However, the Court has not foreclosed
the possibility that general jurisdiction still exists where the quality
of contacts suggest that the corporation is at home. While
continuous, systematic, and substantial contacts with a forum will
no longer impart dispute-blind jurisdiction, some level of corporate
involvement in the forum will still confer general jurisdiction outside
the state of incorporation and principal place of business. The
challenge now is to determine how to analyze such situations and
why they comport with notions of state citizenship.
This Article first suggests formulating the third basis for general
jurisdiction through a three-part test. The first two components, the
presence of an office and employees in the forum, are traditional
considerations suggesting dispute-blind jurisdiction through
substantial commitment to the forum. The final component assesses
the quality of activities occurring in the forum; namely, is the forum
one from which the corporation makes corporate policy or
management decisions? The decision to engage in such activities in
the forum suggests that the corporation is taking advantage of the
state to help further its existence and directives. Such an approach
furthers conventional notions of state territorial power by
ascertaining the types of relationships that would equate to state
citizenship, while also respecting notions of predictability and
jurisdictional availability.

